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DIALOGUE OF THE DEAF:
A COMPARATIVE LEGISLATIVE ANALYSIS OF WEAKFORM JUDICIAL REVIEW
Douglas Tomlinson*

In contrast to the “monologue” of strong-form judicial
review, weak-form judicial review creates a “dialogue” between
the judicial and legislative branches which allegedly results in
more holistic and democratically legitimate interpretations of
constitutional and rights-based questions. For this dialogue,
however, to have such results, the legislature needs to
independently engage in thoughtful analysis on the issue.
Otherwise, it is likely either blindly acquiescing to the judiciary or
blindly imposing its will on the judiciary. Whether weak-form
judicial review promotes such legislative engagement and fulfills
its potential has not been thoroughly examined. This article will
compare the level of legislative engagement in countries with
weak- and strong-form judicial review to determine if weak-form
judicial review results in improved legislative engagement that in
turn promotes democratic dialogue. In so doing, case studies of
legislative responses to judicial decisions will be presented from
the United States, India, and the United Kingdom. The article
concludes that legislative engagement should be one of the
factors analyzed when assessing the benefits of weak-form judicial
review and that legislative engagement might not occur in a
sufficient quantity or quality in models of weak-form judicial
review to result in the alleged dialogic benefits.
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I.

INTRODUCTION

Please allow me to set the scene. You have just come home
from a long day at work. You and your spouse had previously
agreed that you would go out for a romantic dinner when you got
home but you had not agreed on the restaurant. After you greet
your spouse in the entryway, you begin a conversation. The
conversation can go one of three ways.
Conversation 1
Spouse : “Hi honey, it is so great to see you. Where would
you like to go for dinner tonight? I was thinking we could go to
the new Indian restaurant that just opened in town.”
You : “Oh, that is an interesting idea. But my stomach has
been a little queasy today so maybe we can go somewhere else.
How about Italian?”
Spouse : “I am so sorry to hear your stomach has been feeling
queasy. We do not need to go to the Indian place. I am not
really in the mood for Italian though; I had pasta for lunch. How
about we go to the Tex-Mex place? That way you can get
something easy on your stomach, but I can get something spicy!”
You : “Sounds like a plan.”
Conversation 2
Spouse : “Hi honey, it is so great to see you. Where would
you like to go for dinner tonight? I was thinking we could go to
that new Indian restaurant that just opened in town.”
You : “Oh, that is an interesting idea. But my stomach has
been a little queasy today so maybe we can go somewhere else.
How about Italian?”
Spouse: “No. We’re going to the Indian restaurant.”
You: “Ok.”

3
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Conversation 3
Spouse: “Hi honey, it is so great to see you. Where would
you like to go for dinner tonight? I was thinking we could go to
that new Indian restaurant that just opened in town.”
You: “No, I want Italian because my stomach has been
queasy.”
Spouse: “Ok, whatever you say.”
Which conversation sounds the most productive? In all
conversations, there was dialogue. In the first conversation,
however, there was a meaningful dialogue between the partners,
and it was a more productive conversation. Both of their views
were considered and the solution that was decided upon pleased
both of them. In contrast, the dialogues in the second and third
conversations were less meaningful because one partner’s will was
essentially imposed on the other. To reach the result of the first
conversation, it is necessary for the spouse to actually analyze the
situation and, at the very, least consider your concerns about the
Indian restaurant. If the spouse does not even listen to you, as in
Conversation Two, then you need not have spoken in the first
place. Or, if the spouse is excessively complacent, as in
Conversation Three, then your choice will be selected without
there ever being a consideration of the spouse’s possible
preferences.
Now imagine that your spouse is the legislative branch of a
government, you are the judicial branch, and instead of arguing
over somewhere to eat, you are debating the constitutionality of a
law. The spouse passes a law (the Indian restaurant), you
consider it, find it unconstitutional (do not want spicy food), and
pass your comments back to your spouse for final consideration.
The spouse will then either (1) engage in thoughtful analysis and
deliberation, taking into consideration your views on the matter,
and make a final decision, or (2) fail to engage in thoughtful
analysis and deliberation and simply make a final decision, either
enforcing your or your spouse’s preference. If such a dialogue is
to be had between the branches of government when interpreting
the constitutionality of a law, it seems essential to strive for a
dialogue that is meaningful; otherwise, the dialogue does not
serve its intended purpose.
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Systems of weak-form judicial review generate a formal
dialogue between the branches of government because once the
judicial branch makes a constitutional interpretation, its
interpretation is sent back to the legislative branch and the
legislative branch can decide how to proceed. 2 Proponents of
weak-form judicial review argue that weak-form judicial review is
beneficial in part because it replaces the “monologue” of strongform judicial review with a meaningful dialogue among the
branches of government over constitutional or rights-based
interpretation. 3
This dialogue allegedly increases the
participation of the legislative branch in constitutional
interpretation, thereby overcoming the alleged democratic
deficiency of strong-form judicial review and results in rights
being interpreted in a more holistic fashion. 4 Unfortunately, the
effect of adopting a model of weak-form judicial review on
legislative engagement with constitutional issues has not been
thoroughly examined. Although there has been examination into
legislative engagement in the United Kingdom (U.K.), a weakform jurisdiction, a comparative analysis of legislative
engagement between strong- and weak-form models of judicial
review has not been undertaken. 5 This is a significant gap in the
literature because analyzing legislative engagement in only one
weak-form jurisdiction does not provide any indication on
whether adopting weak-form judicial review increases dialogue
because there is no standard against which the legislative
engagement is compared.
As is evident from the two
hypothetical conversations, the judicial branch passing the law
back to the legislative branch does not guarantee meaningful
dialogue. Whether a meaningful dialogue—such as Conversation
One—is the result of adopting weak-form judicial review is
dependent on how the legislature proceeds after receiving the
comments from the judiciary and is the focus of this article.
2
See infra Part II.C for a detailed discussion of the varieties and nuances of
weak-form judicial review.
3
Stephen Gardbaum, Reassessing the New Commonwealth Model of
Constitutionalism, 8 INT’L J. CONST. L. 167, 173 (2010) [hereinafter Gardbaum,
Reassessing].
4 Gardbaum, Reassessing, supra note 3, at 172; see also infra Part II C.
5 See generally, ARUNA SATHANAPALLY, BEYOND DISAGREEMENT: OPEN REMEDIES
IN HUMAN RIGHTS ADJUDICATION (2012).
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This article proceeds in six parts. Part II introduces the
various models of judicial review. It begins with the traditional
form of legislative supremacy, before moving on to strong- and
weak-form judicial review. 6 It describes the particularities of the
different models and the strengths and weaknesses of each. It
concludes by mentioning some of the reasons why it is legitimate
to question whether adopting weak-form review actually results in
increased meaningful dialogue and legislative engagement. Part
III explains the framework through which legislative engagement
will be analyzed, including the cautions and assumptions that will
go into the analysis. Part IV presents the four different case
studies. It begins with two countries with strong-form judicial
review, the U.S. and India, before proceeding to weak-form
judicial review and an examination of the U.K. model. Part V
compares strong-form judicial review to weak-form judicial
review. Part VI draws conclusions from the four case studies. In
particular, this article demonstrates that legislative engagement is
a factor that should be analyzed alongside judicial deference or
activism and legislative deference or response in assessing the
benefits of models of weak-form judicial review. In addition, the
article challenges assumptions about weak-form judicial review
and shows that legislatures in models of weak-form judicial
review might not sufficiently engage themselves in rights- and
constitutional-based issues, and, therefore, the dialogic benefits
of weak-form judicial review might not be achieved. In contrast,
there does appear to be more significant engagement in strongform judicial review systems, indicating the potential for dialogue
and thus the necessity for further analysis into the normative
reasons for this difference.

6
Although these are the names used in this article to describe the various
forms of judicial review, they have many different names. I will briefly mention
these other names in Part II below. See infra II. The theories underpinning these
models are sometimes referred to as political constitutionalism (for legislative
supremacy), legal constitutionalism (for strong-form judicial review), and new or
intermediate constitutionalism (for weak-form judicial review). See Marco Goldoni,
Two Internal Critiques of Political Constitutionalism, 10 INT’L J. CONST. L. 926,
926–27 (2012). For clarity and consistency, I will not use these terms in this article
but will instead refer to the models being used.
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MODELS OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

It is notoriously difficult to precisely categorize the various
models of judicial review. The problems are replete. Some
models of judicial review are expressly written in the text of
constitutions. 7 Unfortunately, however, the provisions can be
ambiguously written or designed. Some models of judicial review
are not written in the text of a constitution but have become
apparent through constitutional events. 8 Others, despite being
written one way in a constitution, are practiced very differently in
reality. 9 Others constantly change due to the struggle between
the various branches of government over where the power shall
lie. In addition, there is an ongoing debate among scholars over
the boundaries of each model of judicial review that further
clouds the picture. 10 Nevertheless, it is important to attempt
categorization because this is helpful for testing theories and for
results to emerge. The following three subsections will make
such an attempt, beginning with legislative supremacy before
moving to strong-form and weak-form judicial review. Each
section will begin with a proposed definition for each category of
judicial review. It will then briefly address the history of each
model, the various forms they may take, and the alleged benefits
and critiques of each.
E.g., ÖSTERREICHISCHE BUNDES-VERFASSUNGSGESETZ [B-VG] [Constitution] as
last amended in 1929 as to No. 153/2004, art. 140 (Austria) (explicitly declaring the
Constitutional Court’s power to pronounce laws unconstitutional).
8
E.g., Nathan J. Brown, Judicial Review and the Arab World, 9 J. DEMOCRACY
85, 88 (1998) (“While judicial review has most often been established by clear
constitutional mandate rather than by a judicial decision, courts in Egypt, Tunisia,
and Jordan have joined their counterparts in the United States and Israel in
asserting a right to judicial review despite the absence of explicit constitutional
authorization.”).
9
See Rivka Weill, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism
Notwithstanding: On Judicial Review and Constitution-Making, 62 AM. J. COMPAR.
L. 127, 130 (2014) (arguing that the strength of judicial review is the “result of the
political processes that accompany the adoption and amendment of the
constitution, rather than the results of the language of constitutional provisions.”).
10
Compare Aileen Kavanagh, What’s So Weak About “Weak-Form Review”?
The Case of the UK Human Rights Act 1998, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1008, 1008
(2015) (arguing that the distinction between strong- and weak-form judicial review
is not that clear), with Stephen Gardbaum, What’s So Weak About “Weak-Form
Review”? A Reply to Aileen Kavanagh, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 1040, 1041 (2015)
(arguing that the distinction lies in the “interplay” of the distinctive features of
weak-form judicial review).
7
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A. Legislative Supremacy
Legislative supremacy, also known as parliamentary
sovereignty or parliamentary supremacy, 11 encompasses the idea
that the legislative branch of government is the “supreme and
absolute power” driving a government and acts as the decisionmaking authority in the legal system. 12 More specifically, to
consider a system of ideal legislative supremacy, the legislative
branch must have the power to pass whatever laws it pleases and
no entity other than the legislative branch itself has the power to
annul these laws. 13 Traditionally, there have been additional
limitations, such as the legislature not having the power to enact
statutes that restrict its successors and constitutional law and
regular law being equal. 14
These additional requirements,
however, do not enjoy universal acceptance. 15
The most famous example of a system of legislative
supremacy is in the U.K., where it evolved into its modern form
from the sovereignty of the medieval King. 16
Since God
appointed the King, and the King was the source of all judgments
of law, the King could not be compelled to follow the law other
11
Note that scholars do not agree that these two names are interchangeable.
For example, some argue that legislative or parliamentary supremacy refers to
when the legislature has the final say on a limited range of options or within a
specified area, whereas legislative or parliamentary sovereignty refers to when the
legislature has the final say on everything and is in no way restricted. Peter Oliver,
Sovereignty in the Twenty-First Century, 14 KING’S COLL. L. J. 137, 138–39 (2003).
12
JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT: HISTORY AND
PHILOSOPHY 126 (2001).
13
See ALBERT V. DICEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE
CONSTITUTION 37–38 (8th ed. 1915) (discussing the principle of parliamentary
sovereignty in the U.K.).
14 See id. at 39–40.
15
See, e.g., Anthony Bradley, The Sovereignty of Parliament-Form or
Substance, in THE CHANGING CONSTITUTION 35, 66–68 (Jeffrey Jowell & Dawn
Oliver eds., 7th ed. 2011). Bradley argues the doctrine of parliamentary
sovereignty in the U.K. has evolved from an absolutist position toward one that
might not impose such stringent requirements as the restriction on binding future
parliaments. Id. As evidence of this shift, he uses various instances in which the
Parliament has bound successor Parliaments; for example, the European
Communities Act of 1972 restricts Parliament by allowing courts to decide whether
an Act of Parliament complies with EU law. Id. at 52–56.
16
See GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 12, for an excellent and thorough history of
how Parliamentary Sovereignty came to be in the United Kingdom.
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than by political means. 17 As time went on, a Parliament formed
as an instrument of the King, and it began to exercise its own
lawmaking power. 18 Despite some disagreement over who had
final lawmaking authority, all parties agreed that as the highest
organ of government representing the people, neither law nor
judicial interpretations of law bound Parliament. 19 Instead,
Parliament was bound only by moral limits that the people would
enforce because Parliament represented the people. 20
A similar evolution occurred as well in continental Europe,
where legislative supremacy was predominant at least until the
middle of the 20th century. 21 After World War II, however, most
countries in Europe switched from a system of legislative
supremacy to one of strong-form judicial review. 22 In continental
Europe, the Netherlands and Switzerland are arguably the only
countries that have retained a system of legislative supremacy. 23
In addition, because of the U.K.’s legislative supremacy, the U.K.
transplanted similar systems in its colonies, such as in India, New
Zealand, and Australia. 24
Outside of Europe and select
Commonwealth countries, there is only a modicum of other
countries that have systems of legislative supremacy. In the
Middle East, for example, Oman, Qatar, and Saudi Arabia have
abstained from implementing any form of judicial review of
legislation. 25
Countries select a model of legislative supremacy for several
reasons. First, and most importantly, many believe legislative
GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 12, at 32.
GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 12, at 275.
19 GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 12, at 59–60.
20
GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 12, at 232–33. Ironically, and as is discussed in
more detail infra Part II C, the United Kingdom might no longer be considered a
system of legislative supremacy in the strict sense of the term.
21 See Gustavo Fernandes de Andrade, Essay, Comparative Constitutional Law:
Judicial Review, 3 J. CONST. L. 977, 978 (2001).
22
But see infra Part II B, C (discussing how some of these countries have
evolved to systems of judicial review).
23 In the Netherlands, “[t]he constitutionality of Acts of Parliament and treaties
shall not be reviewed by the courts.” GW. [Constitution] art. 120 (2018). In
Switzerland, although cantonal (state) law may be judicially reviewed, federal
statutes may not. BUNDESVERFASSUNG [BV] [CONSTITUTION] Apr. 18, 1999, art. 189
(Switz.).
24 See infra Part II C.
25 Brown, supra note 8, at 89.
17
18
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supremacy to be the most democratic form of lawmaking because
it “reserv[es] to the highest democratic body . . . the final say
about the content of the law.” 26 Through its representation of the
people, the legislature puts forward the collective will of the
people. Indeed, the government’s legitimacy to exercise its
powers is predicated on the consent of the people to be
governed.27 Thus, legislative supremacy is theoretically the most
democratic because the people that the laws govern make final
decisions about laws. 28
Relatedly, advocates of legislative
supremacy argue that legislatures are better poised to interpret
laws in a way that satisfies the people because, unlike judges who
are usually not democratically elected, legislators are accountable
to their constituents and thus should be attuned to the realities of
life for their constituents. 29
As such, when pressed with
arguments against legislative supremacy, proponents argue not
to change the entire system but instead to focus on “improving
democratic processes through such measures as reformed
electoral systems and enhanced parliamentary scrutiny.” 30
The second reason underlying legislative supremacy is a far
26
Nicholas W. Barber, The Afterlife of Parliamentary Sovereignty, 9 INT’L J.
CONST. L. 144, 148 (2011).
27 See generally JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (1690).
28
It is for this reason that some theorists of legislative supremacy argue that
the legislature cannot pass laws that restrict future legislatures because if they could,
then they could bind a future generation of people and that future generation
would not be able to decide what the law was for themselves. GOLDSWORTHY, supra
note 12, at 234, 70 (“Each generation should be equally free to reform its laws–
including its constitution–as it deems appropriate.”); see also Barber, supra note
26, at 145–49 (discussing the debate over whether Parliament can restrict its future
self and elaborating the views of “orthodox” and “manner-and-form” theorists in
this debate).
29 Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE L.
J. 1346, 1378 (2006) (arguing that legislatures are aware of the plights of their
constituents and that society’s tolerability for a particular course of action is
included in the decision-making process through features such as elections,
campaigning, lobbying, hearings, and debate); see also GOLDSWORTHY, supra note
12, at 234 (discussing how “judges could not be trusted with authority to nullify
Parliament’s judgments”).
30
RICHARD BELLAMY, POLITICAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: A REPUBLICAN DEFENCE
OF THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF DEMOCRACY, at i (2007). Bellamy also mentions how
certain “pseudo-democratic” measures such as referenda are insufficient for
improving democratic legitimacy because they only help to advance the agendas of
the elites. Id. at 263. Instead, he believes that efforts should at least be made for
proportional representation. Id. at 262.
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more pragmatic one. Proponents of legislative supremacy argue
that giving the last word on the interpretation of a law to the
body that created the law results in more efficient governing. 31
The argument under legislative supremacy is that the legislature
can conduct its affairs and respond to emergencies without being
second-guessed by any institution other than itself. 32 This
allegedly allows for the government to better care for and protect
its citizens. Proponents further argue legislative supremacy
promotes clarity on the status of laws. Instead of leaving citizens
unsure about the application of a law until a court has opined on
it, the law is clear when the legislature passes the law because no
one can override or modify it other than the legislature by a
subsequent act. Despite these arguments in support of legislative
supremacy, it is a dying model. Throughout the twenty-first
century most countries have adopted systems of strong-form
judicial review, which is considered next.
B. Strong-Form Judicial Review
Strong-form judicial review, also known as judicial
supremacy, concerns the legal authority of a court’s constitutional
interpretation. In models of strong-form judicial review, it is
undisputed that the court’s constitutional interpretation binds
parties before it and these parties are bound to act in accordance
with the court’s interpretation. 33 Though less widely accepted,
strong-form judicial review also generally means that the judicial
branch’s interpretation of the constitution binds other actors
within the government, such as the executive and legislative
branches, and the state governments. 34 Thus, when a court rules
See GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 12, at 234 (“as a matter of either logical or
practical necessity, there had to be a single, ultimate, and unlimited law-making
power”).
32
See GOLDSWORTHY, supra note 12, at 234 (“if its authority were limited,
Parliament might be unable to take extraordinary measures needed to protect the
community in emergencies”).
33
Stephen Gardbaum, What is Judicial Supremacy?, in COMPARATIVE
CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 21, 24 ( Gary Jabobsohn & Miguel Schor eds. 2018).
34
See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1361–62 (1997); see also Barry Friedman &
Erin F. Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The Federal Foundation of Judicial
Supremacy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1140 (2011) (disaggregating judicial
supremacy into vertical––binding authority over the state governments, and
31
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that a statute passed by the legislature conflicts with the
constitution, the statute is no longer valid law and that
interpretation is final. Although the “strength” of a court falls on
a spectrum, for purposes of this analysis, a court has the power of
strong-form judicial review if (1) the court can invalidate, modify,
or not apply legislation that it believes is in conflict with a higher
law, such as a constitution; (2) it does, in fact, use this power; and
(3) its decisions are mostly accepted by citizens and by the other
branches of government. 35 In addition, despite the ability of
courts to use measures of judicial deferral to avoid potentially
contentious disputes with the legislative branch, courts are
nevertheless models of strong-form judicial review if they, for
example, use such deferral techniques in an effort to retain their
credibility and enhance their power, rather than merely to
acquiesce to the legislature. 36
Although certain scholars have argued that judicial review
and invalidation of legislation can be traced back to ancient
Athens 37 or Jerusalem, 38 it gained prominence through the
horizontal––binding authority over the coordinate federal branches). But see infra
Part IV A (discussing departmentalism in the U.S., a model of strong-form judicial
review).
35
See Stephen Gardbaum, What Makes for More or Less Powerful
Constitutional Courts?, 29 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 1, 39–40 (2018) (discussing
how the level of power a court has is hard to quantify but arguing that the most
appropriate measure of power is how consequential it is as an institutional actor,
which itself is based on formal rules, actual practice, and its operational political
context).
36
Cf. Erin F. Delaney, Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy in Comparative
Perspective, 66 DUKE L.J. 1, 62–64 (2016) (explaining that there is a fine balancing
act between using judicial deferral to retain institutional legitimacy and promote
dialogue and having the court lose all its power to protect minorities from
majorities). Delaney compares deferral by the U.S. Supreme Court, the European
Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and the apex courts of Canada and South Africa.
She finds that despite the opaque deferral techniques used by the U.S. Supreme
Court, the deferrals have actually strengthened the court’s institutional legitimacy
and allowed it to “accrue power mostly out of the public eye.” Id. at 62. In contrast,
the ECtHR is candid about its limitations and will often allow state limitations on
substantive rights until a public consensus has developed. Id. Publicly
acknowledging such limitations and refusing to overturn statutes until a majority
public consensus has developed is overly deferential and limits the court’s ability to
“fulfill the countermajoritarian aspiration.” Id.
37
Keith Werhan, Popular Constitutionalism, Ancient and Modern, 46 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 65, 76–85, 96–108 (2012) (discussing how in ancient Athens, citizens
could begin legal proceedings against other citizens who had proposed decrees that
allegedly went against the highest law, monos, and that if the dikasteria, a large
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American tradition where it first began to appear in works of
revolutionary political theory. 39 Alexander Hamilton in The
Federalist No. 78 remarked that judges have the power to
ascertain the meaning of the Constitution and statutes, and that
if there is “irreconcilable variance between the two . . . the
Constitution ought to be preferred to the statute” 40 This theory
was a reaction to the British model of legislative supremacy that,
in the eyes of the founders, failed to protect fundamental rights
and liberties.41 As a result of these sentiments, the U.S.
Constitution allowed for judicial review to become established by
making the Constitution and the rights found therein the
supreme law of the land, by declaring that normal legislation
could not change this law, and allowing for the enforcement of
these rights by a judicial power. 42
Although the Constitution theoretically provided the
landscape for judicial review, it was not until the landmark case
of Marbury v. Madison 43 that judicial review gained prominence. 44
In Marbury, Justice John Marshall declared the power of judicial
body of average citizens that served a judge and jury, found the decree to be in
violation of monos, then the decree would be invalidated and the citizen who had
proposed the decree punished).
38 David C. Flatto, The Historical Origins of Judicial Independence and Their
Modern Resonance, 117 YALE L. J. POCKET PART 8, 11 (2007),
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/the-historical-origins-of-judicialindependence-and-their-modern-resonances (discussing how “two formative
moments in the Hebraic tradition–one biblical (Deuteronomy), the other rabbinic
(the Mishnah)–insist on establishing an independent judiciary operating beyond
the reach of the king” and how the biblical tradition specifically subordinates the
king to the judiciary).
39
See Scott D. Gerber, The Political Theory of an Independent Judiciary, 116
YALE L.J. POCKET PART 223, 223 (2007), https://www.yalelawjournal.org/forum/thepolitical-theory-of-an-independent-judiciary.
40 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
41
Stephen Gardbaum, The New Commonwealth Model of Constitutionalism,
49 AM. J. COMPAR. L. 707, 711 (2001) [hereinafter Gardbaum, New Commonwealth
Model].
42
Gardbaum New Commonwealth Model, supra note 41, at 707–08. Note,
however, that the U.S. Constitution does not explicitly provide that judicial review
of legislative acts are non-reviewable by Congress.
43 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803).
44
See generally id.; but see William M. Treanor, Judicial Review Before
Marbury, 58 STAN. L. REV. 455, 457–58 (2005) (arguing that judicial review was
more widespread than many believe, having found twenty-nine cases from before
Marbury in which U.S. courts invalidated legislation).
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review by, inter alia, claiming that the U.S. Constitution is the
“paramount law.” 45 If the Courts “clos[ed] their eyes” to a
legislative act that conflicted with the Constitution, it would be
giving the legislature an “omnipotence” that the founders did not
envision or intend. 46
Although the decision established a
previously unrecognized power of judicial review for the
Supreme Court, it did so in a way that appeased the political
branches and therefore did not receive much backlash. 47 After
Marbury, judicial review persistently grew in strength in the U.S.
with twenty-two statutes invalidated in the 19th century and 125
statutes invalidated in the 20th century.48
Given the success of the American system of strong-form
judicial review, most countries around the world also adopted
models of strong-form judicial review throughout the 20th
century. 49 The two most prominent scenarios in which countries
have adopted strong-form judicial review are: (1) to ensure that
rights are protected from the political branches in the wake of
rights abuses by the government; 50 and (2) to create a neutral
third party to resolve disputes between divisive political branches
and communities. 51 In addition, some established democracies
not falling into the above scenarios have also switched to strongform judicial review. 52 The possible reasons for these switches
are: (1) that adopting strong-form judicial review is associated
with the incorporation of supranational law, such as with the
Marbury, 5 U.S. at 177.
Id. at 177–78.
47
See Rosalind Dixon & Samuel Issacharoff, Living to Fight Another Day:
Judicial Deferral in Defense of Democracy, 2016 WIS. L. REV. 683, 686 (2016)
(discussing how the Marbury strategy is a “‘second-order’ function of judicial
deferral”); see generally Delaney, supra note 36.
48 See generally Acts of Congress Held Unconstitutional in Whole or in Part by
the Supreme Court of the United States, S. Doc. No. 108–17 (2d Sess. 2002),
45
46

https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-CONAN-2002/pdf/GPO-CONAN-200210.pdf.
49 Stephen Gardbaum, Separation of Powers and the Growth of Judicial Review

in Established Democracies (or Why Has the Model of Legislative Supremacy
Mostly Been Withdrawn from Sale?), 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 613, 613–14 (2014)
[hereinafter Gardbaum, Separation of Powers].
50
See Bruce Ackerman, The Rise of World Constitutionalism, 83 VA. L. REV.
771, 776–78 (1997).
51 Gardbaum, Separation of Powers, supra note 49, at 613, 614–15.
52 See Gardbaum, Separation of Powers, supra note 49, at 615–16.

TOMLINSON (DO NOT DELETE)

2022]

DIALOGUE OF THE DEAF

3/1/2022 9:53 AM

15

incorporation of the European Court on Human Rights in
European countries, 53 (2) that it is a widespread constitutional
norm to have judicial review and countries need to have such
systems to “fit in,” 54 and (3) that recent developments have
“undermined faith in political accountability as an effective and
sufficient check on the undue concentration of governmental
authority,” thereby requiring yet another check the political
branches.55 Currently, approximately eighty percent of the
world’s countries have established strong-form judicial review. 56
There are many alleged benefits of strong-form judicial
review, but the one most often presented is that it prevents a
potentially despotic majority from placing its interests above
those of the minority.57 Generally, all that is needed to pass
legislation is a majority of the legislators representing a majority
of the people; therefore, barely over half of the people can
theoretically impose its will on the other, only slightly smaller,
half. Judicial review steps in as a non-politically motivated
neutral check on such exercises of power, thereby protecting the
rights of minorities. 58 Additionally, it is thought that courts
should be involved in invalidating statutes that infringe upon
rights because it is better to have overenforcement of rights than
underenforcement. 59
RAN HIRSCHL, TOWARDS JURISTOCRACY: THE ORIGINS AND CONSEQUENCES OF
NEW CONSTITUTIONALISM 2 (2004) (calling this phenomenon the
“incorporation scenario”).
54
Tom Ginsburg & Mila Versteeg, Why Do Countries Adopt Constitutional
Review?, 30 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 587, 588–89 (2014).
55 Gardbaum, Separation of Powers, supra note 49, at 613.
56
Cf. Ginsburg & Versteeg, supra note 54, at 588 (noting in 2011 that 83%
have strong- or weak-form judicial review). Another distinction is between
centralized and decentralized models of judicial review. For an explanation of this
distinction. See generally, Albert HY Chen & Miguel Poiares Maduro, The
Judiciary and Constitutional Review, in ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW, 97, 102–3 (Mark Tushnet et al. eds., 2015).
57 See Alexander Kaufman & Michael B. Runnels, The Core of an Unqualified
Case for Judicial Review: A Reply to Jeremy Waldron and Contemporary Critics, 82
BROOK. L. REV. 163, 163–64 (2016); see also THE FEDERALIST No. 51 (James
Madison) (stating that “if a majority be united by a common interest, the rights of
the minority will be insecure”).
58
It also serves as a neutral check upon the interplay between the executive
and legislative branches of a republican government; however, given that
separation of powers is not the focus of the article, this point will not be expanded.
59 See Richard H. Fallon, The Core of an Uneasy Case for Judicial Review, 121
53

THE
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There are two primary critiques of strong-form judicial
review. The first is that it is undemocratic and that important
rights-based questions should instead be delegated to the public
and its representatives for debate. 60 The best counterargument to
this is that democratic governance is only achieved when all
citizens participate in the governmental process together on
equal terms, and therefore, because not all people equally
participate in politics, allowing majorities to decide issues is not
actually democratic. 61 Instead, the court should serve as a
“referee . . . to police the political process” and should “reinforce
representation and enhance participation in both the processes
of democratic government and in the government’s distribution
of benefits.” 62 Additionally, the critique that strong-form judicial
review is undemocratic in comparison to legislative supremacy is
not entirely persuasive considering how elections are often “too
blunt, too infrequent, and typically raise too many issues for
electoral consideration” to be effective manifestations of
democratic will. 63 Other valid, though less persuasive, arguments
attempt to claim that strong-form judicial review is not
undemocratic because legislators can amend the constitution if
they disagree with the court, judges are appointed by legislators
representing the people, and citizens have access to the judicial
HARV. L. REV. 1693, 1735 (2008). Fallon is careful to note, however, that this theory
does not apply when the court is deciding a case between competing rights because
in such a case it will invariably have to overenforce one right and underenforce the
other.
60 Richard Bellamy, The Political Form of the Constitution: The Separation of
Powers, Rights, and Representative Democracy, 44 POL. STUD. 436, 456 (1996). But
see Annabelle Lever, Democracy and Judicial Review: Are They Really
Incompatible?, 7 PERSP. ON POL. 805, 808 (2009) (noting that many electoral
systems allow parties elected with only a minority of the vote to form a government;
therefore, even giving the decision to the political branches is not necessarily
democratically justified); see also Jane Mansbridge, A “Selection Model” of Political
Representation, 17 J. POL. PHIL. 369, 386–87 (2009) (suggesting that legislators
should be selected based on superior wisdom and should thus should not constrain
themselves to the ideals of their constituents).
61
Kaufman & Runnels, supra note 57, at 163–64 (“the defining quality of
democratic government––according to such leading theorists as Ronald Dworkin,
Joshua Cohen, and Cécile Fabre––is . . . the joint and equal participation of citizens
in the process of self-government.”).
62
Paul N. Cox, John Hart Ely, Democracy and Distrust: A Theory of Judicial
Review, 15 VAL. U. L. REV. 637, 639–40 (1981).
63 Lever, supra note 60, at 811.
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system and therefore can engage in governmental processes.64
The second primary critique is that strong-form judicial
review allows legislators to shirk their constitutional
responsibilities by relying on the court. 65 Under this critique,
legislators will ignore constitutional issues in legislation, knowing
that the court will fix any defects; or legislators will base their
constitutional interpretation on how they think the court will
interpret the issue, rather than hold independent constitutional
judgment. 66 The general counterargument to this is that the
critique is based on an “exaggerated view of legislators’ ability
and high-mindedness.” 67 Politics, it is alleged, is not rational and
interest groups and economic elites often drive it; therefore,
restraining judicial review will likely not result in any meaningful
improvement in legislative constitutional thought because
legislators will still not be incentivized to legislate for the
common good.68 In light of these critiques, certain countries
64
See Waldron, supra note 29, at 1394–95 (discussing these arguments and
why they do not persuade him). Another argument is that judges, by being
presented with particularized facts after the statute has already been in effect, can
inform the legislature of an inadequacy in their statute that they did not initially
realize. I do not include this argument above, however, because it also works with
weak-form judicial review, discussed infra Part II C.
65
This argument was first advanced and made famous by James Thayer. See
generally James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 155–56 (1893); see also James B. Thayer,
John Marshall, in JAMES BRADLEY THAYER, OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, AND FELIX
FRANKFURTER ON JOHN MARSHALL 3, 86 (1967) (“The tendency of a common and
easy resort to [judicial review of legislation], now lamentably too common, is to
dwarf the political capacity of the people, and to deaden its sense of moral
responsibility. It is not a light thing to do that.”). But see infra Part IV C (discussing
how it is possible that this happens in models of weak-form judicial review as well).
66
James B. Thayer, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of
Constitutional Law, 7 HARV. L. REV. 129, 155–56 (1893).
67 Richard Posner, The Rise and Fall of Judicial Self-Restraint, 100 CAL. L. REV.
519, 550 (2012).
68
See Gary Lawson, Thayer Versus Marshall, 88 NW. L. REV. 221 (1993)
(discussing how the case against Thayerism, in which courts defer to legislatures on
constitutional questions because legislators are wise and politically adept, is rooted
in the fact that politics is often invective and irrational); Ganesh Sitaraman, The
Puzzling Absence of Economic Power in Constitutional Theory, 101 Cornell L. Rev.
1445, 1455-66, 1467-68 (2016) (arguing that politics in the United States is
dominated by economic elites and “the preferences of the vast majority of
Americans appear to have essentially no impact on which policies the government
does or doesn’t adopt,” and that this is problematic for Republicanism because it
contradicts the assumption that legislators are “free of interested ties and paid by
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have turned to a model that strives to find a middle ground:
weak-form judicial review.
C. Weak-Form Judicial Review
Weak-form judicial review attempts to bridge the gap
between legislative supremacy and strong-form judicial review by
institutionalizing a system that is theoretically supposed to have
the rights protection of strong-form judicial review with the
democratic legitimacy of legislative supremacy.69 Models of weakform judicial review have three essential characteristics: (1) a
constitution or bill of rights; (2) courts with the power to
interpret the constitution or bill of rights and to assess statutes
for conformity with such interpretation; and (3) legislatures with
the formal power to override the court’s interpretation with
ordinary legislation. 70 In practice, this means that although the
court may declare that in its view a statute is incompatible with a
bill of rights, this does not settle the issue and the statute will
return to the legislature who will decide if they agree or disagree
with the court’s interpretation. In this regard, it is said that
weak-form judicial review reserves for the legislature the “final
word.” 71
Note that this article’s definition of the characteristics of
weak-form judicial review excludes certain countries that
arguably have models of weak-form judicial review. First, it
excludes countries that have legislatures that can, and do,
override the decision of courts with extraordinary legislation,
e.g., constitutional amendment by two-thirds majority.
Therefore, for example, the Asian states of Singapore and
Malaysia––where the decisions of courts are frequently
overturned by constitutional amendment of a two-thirds
majority––do not fit within my definition of weak-form judicial

no masters” and legislate for the “common good.”).
69
Gardbaum, Reassessing, supra note 3, at 169, 171 (“The new model is . . .
intermediate between [the] two previously exhaustive polar options” and “provides
a better balance between the two constitutional goods.”).
70 Gardbaum, Reassessing, supra note 3, at 170 (“[T]he model’s great novelty is
to decouple the power of judicial review from judicial supremacy or finality.”).
71 Gardbaum, New Commonwealth Model, supra note 41, at 709.
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review. 72 Second, my definition excludes countries that do not
have the formal power to overturn the decisions of courts with
ordinary legislation. This serves to exclude countries with
models of parliamentary sovereignty that can implicitly repeal
past legislation via ordinary future legislation. 73 This article
excludes these two categories because they speak more to the
level of constitutionalism rather than to the model of judicial
review. They fit more in categories that could be called “weak
courts (or strong-legislatures) in models of legislative supremacy”
or “strong courts (or weak legislatures) in models of strong-form
judicial review,” rather than in an actual model of weak-form
judicial review. This article also excludes them because this
article attempts to analyze whether adopting a formal system of
weak-form judicial review increases constitutional dialogue,
rather than whether evolving constitutional norms of judicial
deference and the subjective strength of the various institutions
results in increased constitutional dialogue. 74
The first instance of weak-form judicial review came from
Canada. 75 In 1982, Canada legally separated from the U.K. 76
Constitution of the Republic of Singapore, art. 5, Aug. 9, 1965; Malaysia:
Federal Constitution, art. 159, Aug. 27, 1957; see generally PO JEN YAP,
72

CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUE IN COMMON LAW ASIA (2015) (discussing several
constitutional crises in Hong Kong, Singapore, and Malaysia and arguing that
further deference by the judicial branch in countries with dominant political parties
would enhance constitutional dialogue).
73 The theory being that in a country with legislative supremacy, if a court rules
a statute to be invalid, the legislature can enact another law via simple majority
that, per the doctrine of implied repeal, would override the court’s decision because
the most recent statute would be given effect over the previous statute. The
legislature in a system of legislative supremacy does not need to explicitly be given
such override power because the legislature is by nature supreme. But cf. Rivka
Weill, Reconciling Parliamentary Sovereignty and Judicial Review: On the
Theoretical and Historical Origins of the Israeli Legislative Override Power, 39
HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 457, 504–05 (2012) (arguing that Israel has a form an
intermediate constitutionalism because there exists a tradition of parliamentary
sovereignty concurrent with the presence of the power of judicial review of
legislation).
74 See Grégoire Webber, The Unfulfilled Potential of the Court and Legislature
Dialogue, 43 CANADIAN J. POL. SCI. 443, 457 (2009) (arguing that although weakform constitutional review “may facilitate dialogue . . . but the dialogue must come
from outside [from] political culture . . . and commitment to performance of
dialogue”).
75
Weill, supra note 73, at 506–10 (discussing how the formal override power
has its roots in the power of implied repeal found in models of parliamentary
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With this separation, Canada passed the Constitution Act of
1982, which included the Canadian Charter of Rights and
Freedoms.77 The Charter guarantees certain fundamental rights
that may be enforced in the courts and that enjoy the status of
supreme law. 78 Although Prime Minster Pierre Trudeau wanted
the Constitution to have similar strength and effect as the
American one, provincial politicians were wary of straying too far
from the model of parliamentary sovereignty. 79 As a compromise
in order to secure passage, Section 33 was included at the last
minute. 80 Section 33 declares that “Parliament or the legislature
of a province may expressly declare in an Act of Parliament or of
the legislature . . . that the Act or a provision thereof shall
operate notwithstanding a [fundamental right] of this Charter.” 81
Such a declaration lasts for five years and is renewable. 82
Therefore, in theory, if a court declares a statute incompatible
with the Charter, Parliament can pass a law via simple majority
stating that the statute at issue applies “notwithstanding” the
court’s finding that it violates a Charter right. 83
Weak-form judicial review has since been adopted in
different versions in the U.K., Australia, and New Zealand. 84 In
the U.K. and Australia, weak-form judicial review comes in the
form of a statutory bill of rights and the judicial power to declare

sovereignty).
76 See Canada Act, 1982, c. 11 (U.K.), § 2.
77
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act,
1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act, 1982, ch. 11 (U.K.) [hereinafter
Constitution Act]. Note that Canada did have a form of legislative override in the
Canadian Bill of Rights enacted in 1960. See Gardbaum, New Commonwealth
Model, supra note 41, at 722.
78 Constitution Act, supra note 77, at §§ 32, 52.
79 Gardbaum, New Commonwealth Model, supra note 41, at 721.
80 Gardbaum, New Commonwealth Model, supra note 41, at 721–22.
81 Constitution Act, supra note 77, at § 33(1).
82 Constitution Act, supra note 77, at §§ 33 (3), (4).
83
Ironically, this power has almost never been used other than in Quebec
where it is used as a blanket statement in all provincial legislation.
84
Outside of these countries, Poland, Romania, Mongolia, Belgium, Finland,
and Luxembourg have also briefly experimented with weak-form judicial review.
STEPHEN GARDBAUM, THE NEW COMMONWEALTH MODEL OF CONSTITUTIONALISM:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 5–6 (David Dyzenhaus & Adam Tomkins eds., 2013)
[hereinafter GARDBAUM, THEORY AND PRACTICE].
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statutes incompatible with the bill of rights. 85 In contrast to
Canada, such declarations do not render the incompatible
statutes void but merely pass the issue back to the legislature to
have the final word. 86 In these countries, courts also have an
obligation to interpret statutes to the maximum extent possible
in a way that does not conflict with the applicable bill of rights. 87
In contrast, in New Zealand, courts cannot declare a statute
incompatible but do have the obligation to interpret statutes to
the maximum extent possible in a way that does not conflict with
the country’s Bill of Rights. 88
As previously discussed, the principal benefit of weak-form
judicial review is that it institutionalizes a system that attempts to
protect individual rights while maintaining democratic
legitimacy. Instead of the will of the legislature or judiciary being
opposed in a “monologue,” there is an “inter-institutional
dialogue” between the two that should help limit the
countermajoritarian difficulty but also protect individual rights. 89
This dialogue, beyond balancing democracy and protecting
rights, has numerous alleged benefits.90
85
See Human Rights Act 1998, ch. 42, § 4 (U.K.) [hereinafter UK HRA];
Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT) s 32 (Austl.) [hereinafter ACT HRA]; Charter of
Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic.) s 28 (Austl.) [hereinafter

VCHRR]. Note that Australia has institutionalized weak-form judicial review at the
State level but not at the federal level.
86
See UK HRA, supra note 85, at § 4(6); ACT HRA, supra note 85, at s 32;
VCHRR supra note 85, at ss 28, 31 (stating a declaration of incompatibility is not
binding on the parties to the proceedings in which it is made). The precise
operation of the UK HRA will be addressed infra Part IV C.
87
UK HRA supra note 85, at § 3; ACT HRA supra note 85, at s 30; VCHRR
supra note 85, at s 32.
88 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s 6 (N.Z.) [hereinafter NZBORA].
89 Gardbaum, New Commonwealth Model, supra note 41, at 745; see also Peter
Hogg & Allison Bushell, The Charter Dialogue Between Courts and Legislatures
(Or Perhaps Why the Charter of Rights Isn’t Such a Bad Thing After All), 35
OSGOODE HALL L. J. 75 (1997) (advancing Constitutional Dialogue in weak-form
judicial review in their seminal article on the Canadian Charter).
90
Note that several prominent scholars believe that “dialogue” is not the
principal benefit nor a useful theory for weak-form judicial review. For example,
Stephen Gardbaum believes that dialogue is not the correct lens through which to
view weak-form judicial review because other forms of review also have dialogue, for
example, departmentalism. See Gardbaum, Reassessing, supra note 3, at 181.
Instead, he posits that that the principal benefit of weak-form judicial review is the
balance between protecting rights and promoting democracy. Gardbaum,
Reassessing, supra note 3, at 182. As I will discuss, while I generally agree, I also
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First, inter-institutional dialogue can lead to a richer and
more holistic interpretation and enforcement of rights. The
“iterative process” of dialogue among the branches of
government increases the amount of information available to the
courts and legislatures in assessing social and economic rights
protections.91 While determining how to enforce protection of
rights is “information intensive,” courts and legislatures are
limited in the information they can compile; therefore, a
dialogue whereby the courts and legislatures share information is
beneficial and more information will lead to more systematic and
effective enforcement of rights. 92 Courts and legislatures have
different areas of expertise and methods of interpretation.
Courts often rely solely on legal arguments whereas legislatures
may rely also on moral and political judgments. 93 Thus, a
dialogue between the two branches results in a richer rights
interpretation because a variety of different points of view are
included. 94 Open dialogue between the branches can also help
spur a “society-wide constitutional discussion” which can
ultimately lead to more consensus on the interpretation of a
right. 95
Second, courts remanding issues to the legislature in a
constitutional dialogue allows the courts to help the legislature
overcome some of its institutional shortcomings. Rosalind Dixon
has classified these shortcomings as legislative “blind-spots” and

believe that if there is not a meaningful dialogue between the branches, then there
is not a balance between protecting rights and promoting democracy because one
will take precedence over the other. Therefore, meaningful dialogue is a necessary
condition for there to be balance.
91
See Mark Tushnet, The Relation Between Political Constitutionalism and
Weak Form Judicial Review, 14 GERMAN L. J. 2249, 2258 (2013) (stating the
iterative features of weak-form review elicit additional information for both the
legislature and the courts to use as they engage and re-engage questions of
enforcement).

Id.
See Rosalind Dixon, The Core Case for Weak-Form Judicial Review, 38
CARDOZO L. REV. 2193, 2226 (2017) (describing the Court’s justification of Roe v.
Wade as not relying on a thorough analysis of moral and political arguments as to
92
93

when life begins).
94 Cf. Dixon, Core Case, supra note 93, at 2226.
95
Christine Bateup, The Dialogic Promise: Assessing the Normative Potential
of Theories of Constitutional Dialogue, 71 BROOK. L. REV. 1109, 1157 (2006).
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“burdens of inertia.” 96 In terms of blind-spots, legislatures are
limited by time, resources, expertise, and the cognitive limits of
the mind, and therefore cannot think of everything and might
miss important aspects of rights issues when passing legislation. 97
Courts, by engaging in a dialogue with the legislature after the
law has passed can bring these blind-spots to the attention of
legislatures so that the legislature can decide how to deal with
them. 98 In terms of burdens of inertia, legislatures might not
sufficiently address minority rights because of political realities
such as the necessity of building coalitions and political
willingness. 99 By engaging in a constitutional dialogue, courts can
remind legislatures that minority issues are important and that
they deserve to be fully discussed and addressed at the legislative
level. 100
Although the dialogue generated by weak-form judicial
review has numerous alleged benefits, for these benefits to
accrue, the dialogue between the branches needs to be
meaningful. The concept of dialogue “evokes an image of an
equal rather than hierarchical relationship, where everyone
shares their point of view and listens respectfully to alternative
suggestions, evaluating them on their merits.” 101 Without this
sense of equality, cooperation, and respect, the dialogue is not
meaningful and does not accomplish its purported benefits. For
example, if the legislature always acquiesces to the court without
evaluating the court’s reasoning or exercising its own
constitutional judgment, then rights can be interpreted in an
entirely legalistic way without consideration to the various moral
and political issues undergirding the right. Conversely, if the
legislature entirely ignores the courts, the dialogue cannot
overcome legislative inertia and blind-spots that risk hampering
See generally Dixon, Core Case, supra note 93.
Dixon, Core Case, supra note 93, at 2208–09.
98 Dixon, Core Case, supra note 93, at 2214–16.
99 Dixon, Core Case, supra note 93, at 2209–12.
100 Dixon, Core Case, supra note 93, at 2216–20.
101 Aileen Kavanagh, The Lure and Limits of Dialogue, 66 UNIV. TORONTO L. J.
83, 85 (2016); see also Kent Roach, Constitutional, Remedial, and International
Dialogues About Rights: The Canadian Experience, 40 TEX. INT’L L. J. 537, 538
96
97

(2005) (characterizing dialogue as a “sense of openness, modesty, and willingness to
learn from others”).
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minority rights. Additionally, it risks ignoring valid legal claims
that the court might have been well-suited to make. Therefore,
for weak-form judicial review to properly balance between
protecting rights and promoting democracy, there needs to be
meaningful dialogue.
Numerous scholars have opined on “true dialogue” and
whether weak-form judicial review advances their position. 102 For
some, the mere fact that there is official legislative action in the
wake of a judicial decision, regardless of its substance, is
demonstrative of dialogue. 103 Meanwhile, others assess the
existence of true dialogue based on a legislative “practice of
challenging court judgments.” 104
These scholars believe if
legislatures agree with courts, then the legislatures may merely
acquiesce to the court’s interpretation of the constitution. 105 Still,
others argue that if the legislatures are not overriding judicial
decisions, it is because the model of weak-form judicial review has
increased the pressure on the judiciary to defer to legislative
decisions, thereby constraining inter-institutional dialogue. 106
Although such approaches are factors to analyze in assessing
weak-form judicial review, they do not capture the entire picture
because legislatures and courts may simply agree with one
another’s own, independent interpretation. 107 Therefore, in
analyzing whether there is a meaningful, or “true,” dialogue
Kavanagh, supra note 101, at 96.
See Hogg & Bushnell, supra note 89, at 82 (referring to dialogue
occurrence when a “competent legislative body” both considers and reacts to
judicial decisions).
104
Webber, supra note 74, at 457–58 (stating “one must search for a
disposition for dialogue evidenced by a legislative willingness to challenge and a
practice of challenging court judgments coupled with active legislative engagement
on constitutional questions”).
105
See, e.g., Fergal F. Davis, Parliamentary Supremacy and the ReInvigoration of Institutional Dialogue in the UK, 67 PARLIAMENTARY AFF. 137, 144–
45 (2014) (referring to Parliament adjusting its legislation with that of the Court’s
interpretation only because it believes it will “be unable to make its own
interpretation stick”).
106
Rosalind Dixon, Weak-Form Judicial Review and American Exceptionalism
2–3 (Univ. Chicago. Pub. L. & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 348, 2011).
107
See Kavanagh, supra note 101, at 112 (highlighting that United Kingdom
empirical studies reveal a reason for high compliance rate is that the legislature
often agrees with “declarations of incompatibility” viewing them as uncontroversial
‘quiet cases’ which do not give rise to any legislative resistance or disgruntlement”).
102
103
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between the court and the legislature, one must not simply look
at how often courts strike down legislation or how often
legislatures override court decisions; instead, the analysis must
also consider whether each party is performing its own
independent institutional duties of constitutional interpretation
during their part of the dialogue.
Some preliminary research into this question has been
undertaken. Aruna Sathanapally provided an in-depth analysis
of legislative engagement and responses to judicial declarations
of incompatibility in the U.K., a weak-form jurisdiction. 108 She
concludes that the legislative response has usually been
cooperative because of the often non-controversial nature of
declarations of incompatibility and that in the limited
controversial cases where there has been legislative disagreement,
the legislative response has never been to outright refuse to
change a law in response to a declaration of incompatibility. 109
Her analysis, however, is limited because she does not provide a
competing standard against which to judge the U.K.’s level of
legislative engagement. 110 Rosalind Dixon and Brigid McManus
have taken the first step toward a comparative analysis of the
issue by examining legislative responses to three cases regarding
the rights of non-citizens in immigration detention in the U.K.,
New Zealand, and Australia. 111 They conclude that the success of
weak-form judicial review is driven by the level of legislative
competition over rights interpretations, which is in turn driven by
the quality of democratic institutions and the presence of
competitive political parties.112
Their analysis, however, is
constrained because it selected a limited number of uniquely
controversial cases and only compared weak-form models among
themselves rather than against models of strong-form judicial
review. 113 A comparative analysis of legislative engagement
SATHANAPALLY, supra note 5, at 7.
SATHANAPALLY, supra note 5, at 224.
110
See Ran Hirschl, The Question of Case Selection in Comparative
Constitutional Law, 53 AM. J. CONST. L. 125, 126-27 (2005) (noting the limitations
of single country studies).
111
Rosalind Dixon & Brigid McManus, Detaining Non-Citizens: Political
Competition and Weak v. Strong Judicial Review, 57 VA. J. INT’L L. 591, 594 (2018).
112 Id. at 618–19.
113 But see Hirschl, supra note 110, at 144-45 (explaining that according to the
108
109
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between strong- and weak-form models of judicial review will
more effectively determine whether adopting a model of weakform judicial review will actually promote meaningful dialogue.
The lack of such a comparative analysis is a significant gap in
the literature because there are several reasons why it is
legitimate to question whether adopting weak-form review
actually results in meaningful dialogue and legislative
engagement. If the legislature knows that it will always have the
final word, there is no incentive to concentrate on protecting
rights and on the constitutionality of the laws passed because they
can never be wrong. In contrast, in models of strong-form
judicial review, where the court has the final word, the legislature
will have the incentive to focus on the rights and constitutional
issues because they want their legislation to succeed, and if they
ignore those issues, they risk losing the legislation to a court
decision. Relatedly, there is not a strong incentive in models of
weak-form judicial review for the legislature to consider the
court’s interpretation because they are likely more motivated by
political implications than legal implications, regardless of a
remand by the court. Although the court’s legal interpretation
might be infallible, the legislature still does not have the political
will and motivation to protect minority rights, and it is possible
that a remand by the court does not necessarily create such
political will. This article will now introduce a framework for
comparatively analyzing the level of legislature engagement in
strong- and weak-form models of judicial review and whether
adopting weak-form judicial review results in increased legislative
engagement, thereby promoting a meaningful dialogue with the
courts.

“‘most difficult case principle’ . . . confidence in the validity of a given claim . . . is
enhanced once it has proven to hold true in a case that is, prima facie, the most
challenging our least favorable to it.”). However, the “most difficult case principle”
does not apply well here because, in the context of analyzing legislative
engagement, it is likely that the more difficult or controversial the case, the more
likely there to be legislative engagement. Id. Therefore, legislative engagement in
weak-form judicial review increasing for “difficult” cases would not enhance our
confidence in legislative engagement for non-controversial cases because the
legislature could be disinterested in uncontroversial cases. See infra Part III B.
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LEGISLATIVE ENGAGEMENT FRAMEWORK

This article does not attempt to analyze the substantive
quality of a legislative decision. Nor does it attempt to analyze
whether meaningful legislative engagement on a constitutional
question resulted in the substantively “correct” result. Such
analysis is nearly impossible because there is not one accepted
method for analyzing the substance of a decision and
disagreement on substance will nearly always remain. Moreover,
no procedure for reviewing legislation is perfect and even the
best systems will occasionally reach substantively dubious
results. 114 Instead, this article is simply concerned with whether
the legislative branch meaningfully engaged in a constitutional
dialogue.
As previously discussed, a legislature needs to have an
internal debate to engage meaningfully. Therefore, this article
will focus on analyzing the quantity and quality of legislative
engagement on an issue. This review is limited to instances where
the legislature debated whether to overturn a judicial declaration
of incompatibility or whether to enact a statute of similar scope
after a judicial invalidation of a statute. It does not include
instances where legislators merely “give vent to their
disappointment” over a judicial decision––though the line may
occasionally blur. 115
A. Assessing Legislative Deliberation
Whether a legislative dialogue over the constitutionality of a
statute is meaningful is necessarily subjective and can be based on
numerous factors. Although this article is not an empirical
assessment, it is worth looking to other empirical studies of
deliberation for guidance. Jürg Steiner and colleagues have
created what they call the “Discourse Quality Index” (“DQI”) that
purports to analyze the level of deliberation in plenary sessions as

See Waldron, supra note 29, at 1372–76 (discussing whether to analyze
judicial review from an outcome-related or process-related perspective and finding
that while outcome-related reasons are important, they are “inconclusive.”).
115
United States v. Morgan, 313 U.S. 409, 421 (1941) (noting the “practice
familiar in the long history of Anglo-American litigation, whereby unsuccessful
litigants and lawyers give vent to their disappointment in tavern or press.”).
114
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well as committee meetings.116 Notably, the DQI covers: “(1)
participation in the debate; (2) level of justification of arguments;
(3) content of justification of arguments; (4) respect shown
toward other groups; (5) respect shown toward demands of other
participants; (6) respect shown toward [counterarguments] of
other participants; [and] (7) changes in position during
debate.” 117 Similarly, Edward Lascher has proposed measuring
legislative deliberation via several indicators, notably: (1)
attendance by legislators at the debate or hearing; (2) inclusion of
a variety of perspectives; (3) framing arguments in terms of the
public good; (4) ability to present information to bolster these
arguments; (5) allowance of critiques and responses to the
differing perspectives; and (6) the level of engagement and
interaction among participants. 118 He also emphasizes that when
assessing legislative debate, it is important to consider both
quantitative as well as qualitative factors. 119 Although the various
indicators mentioned will not be explicitly used, they are
nevertheless useful to keep in mind when case studies introduce
various forms of deliberation within the legislature. In addition,
though these factors may be subjective and subject to
manipulation, there are often instances where they will clearly
delineate between a meaningful and non-meaningful debate. For
example, one debate where many legislators all voice their
opinions on the constitutionality of a law and ground their
opinion in strong and diverse justifications will be more
meaningful than a debate where only a few legislators declared
their opinions and did not support their opinions with more than
mere assertions that the statute was constitutional. Similarly, a
debate where all legislators voice opinions with justifications but
show no respect toward other participants, do not engage with
counterarguments, and instead are set with their predetermined
opinions can be said to lack the “dynamism” necessary to be
considered a meaningful dialogue. 120
116
JÜRG STEINER, THE FOUNDATION OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: EMPIRICAL
RESEARCH AND NORMATIVE IMPLICATIONS 12 (2012).
117

Id.

Edward L. Lascher, Jr., Assessing Legislative Deliberation: A Preface to
Empirical Analysis, 21 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 501, 509 (1996).
119 Lascher, supra note 118, at 510–11.
120
See Bjørn Erik Rasch, Legislative Debates and Democratic Deliberation in
118
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Having discussed what to look for, it is important also to
mention where to look. Although some scholars contend that
floor debate is the most important area of deliberation, others
have argued that committee hearings and markups are also
important––if not more so—than floor debate. 121 These scholars
argue that, whereas floor debate is truncated and generalized,
committee hearings and markups allow for a more detailed and
expert examination of the issue at hand; for example, by calling
expert witnesses and analyzing their testimony. 122 However,
because some bills can skip the committee process and because
floor debate allows for more legislators to become involved in the
debate, this analysis will not be limited to either one. 123 Instead, it
will assess the multitude of legislative forums, including floor
debates, hearings, and committee markups. It will also analyze
the text and reports of particular bills for evidence of legislative
debate. Although there are various other avenues through which
legislators can debate an issue, such as private meetings, or
meetings outside the legislative context, these will not be
featured prominently in the analysis.124

Parliamentary Systems, THE RSCH. PROGRAMME ON DEMOCRACY 5–6 (2011) (Nor.).
But cf. Lascher, supra note 118, at 506 (noting that an assessment of open-

mindedness is necessarily difficult because the line between “hewing to a set of core
principles” and “being unwilling to consider how such principles relate to a
particular set of circumstances” is ambiguous.).
121
See Paul J. Quirk, Structures and Performance: An Evaluation, THE POSTREFORM CONGRESS 303, 307 (1992).
122 Id. at 307–08; see also Lascher, supra note 118, at 507–08 (mentioning that
we should hesitate excessively crediting floor debate because it is possible that
truncated floor debate is simply the result of more thorough deliberation in the
committee setting).
123
See Abbe R. Gluck, Anne Joseph O’Connell, & Rosa Po, Unorthodox
Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789, 1800 (2015)
(finding significant “process deviations” in the passing of legislation). For example,
Gluck found that “in the first year of the 112th Congress, fewer than 10% of
enacted laws proceeded through the ‘textbook’ legislative process (first passing
through committees on each side, then moving to debate and vote in each
chamber, followed by conference between the chambers, and concluding with a
final vote by both chambers before passage).” Id.
124
See Laschler, supra note 118, at 508–09 (noting the practical difficulties of
assessing informal and outside deliberation).
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B. Cautions and Assumptions
Before analyzing the case studies, it is important to
recognize some limitations inherent in analyses of legislative
action. While this research of legislative engagement into the
constitutionality of a law and the validity of a judicial decision will
result in certain conclusions about the model of judicial review
that best promotes dialogue, these conclusions are limited by
other factors that can also influence the level of dialogue and the
quality of the case studies’ analysis. The first issue that will limit
the conclusions of the analysis is the nature of legislative debate
itself. Although floor debate is where the deliberation is supposed
to occur, deliberation and negotiation often occur behind closed
doors and away from the public eye. This private debate occurs
not just between legislators themselves, but also between
legislators and their staff or outside consultants. In addition,
public debate can be limited by procedural rules, often instigated
at the behest of an imposing political party, that force the debate
private. Therefore, it is possible that even though there was little
public debate over the constitutionality of a law, there could have
been a vibrant private debate that created a meaningful
dialogue. 125
In addition, in the case of legislative review of court
decisions overriding past legislative acts, the subject matter of the
statute at issue is likely to affect how involved the legislature will
be.126 Indeed, Robert Dahl has found that despite judicial
invalidation of legislation, the U.S. Congress has generally found
ways of overcoming this invalidation to achieve their goals on

125
Although this would create meaningful internal dialogue that would help
support the benefits of judicial review, private debate has its limitations. For
example, if the issue was to return once again to the courts, they would not have
any guidance if the deliberative process was opaque because all of their reasonings
were made in private. Cf. Aileen Kavanagh, Proportionality and Parliamentary
Debates: Exploring Some Forbidden Territory, 34 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 443,
478–79 (2014) (finding a trend in the U.K. whereby courts have begun to “take the
quality of the legislative decision-making process into account when assessing
whether legislation is compatible with [HRA] rights.”).
126
See Lascher, supra note 118, at 511–12 (because legislators face the
problem of “too many decisions and too little time to make them . . . they cannot
deliberate about everything” and the level of deliberation will vary “in part [by] the
nature of the issue.”).
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policies that they considered to be important. 127 In particular, it
is possible that the legislature will become significantly more
involved in the legal debate if the court overruled a statute that
affected the legislature’s own power. From the U.S. perspective,
one of the most prominent examples of this was the battle for
laws regulating child labor during the early 20th century. 128
Congress’ first attempt to regulate child labor was with the
Keating-Owen Child Labor Act of 1916 through its power to
regulate interstate commerce. 129
The U.S. Supreme Court
overturned this law in Hammer v. Dagenhart because the Court
found that Congress had exceeded its commerce power. 130
Congress tried to evade the decision by passing a similar act
based on Congress’ taxing power, but the Supreme Court
invalidated that as well. 131 Finally, in 1938, Congress passed the
Fair Labor Standards Act that again regulated child labor based
on Congress’ commerce power.132 An amenable Supreme Court
upheld this act in 1941. 133 This legal battle is interesting because
most states already had child labor laws when Dagenhart was
decided and there was not a popular backlash against the
Dagenhart decision that would have propelled Congress to
engage for political reasons. 134 Given that these factors were
missing, it seems plausible that Congress engaged so substantially
on the issue because they disagreed with the Court’s view of
congressional power.
Whichever political party controls is also likely to affect the
level of legislative engagement. For example, imagine that Party
127 Robert A. Dahl, Decision-Making in a Democracy: The Supreme Court as a
National Policy-Maker, 6 J. PUB. L. 279, 287–88 (1957) (collecting cases and finding

that Congress was able to “reverse [the] Court’s policy” in ten of fifteen cases that
revolved around “major policy”––excluding the New Deal cases).
128 See Mark E. Herrmann, Looking Down from the Hill: Factors Determining

the Success of Congressional Efforts to Reverse Supreme Court Interpretations of
the Constitution, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 543, 547–68 (1992) (describing Congress’
attempts to regulate child labor).
129
Act of Sept. 1, 1916, ch. 432, Pub. L. No. 249, 39 Stat. 675 (overturned by
Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918)).
130 Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 277 (1918).
131 See Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co., 259 U.S. 20, 44 (1922).
132 Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Pub. L. No. 718, 52 Stat. ch. 676.
133 United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 125 (1941).
134
Keith E. Whittington, Congress Before the Lochner Court, 85 B.U. L. REV.
821, 849 (2005).
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A passes a law. If by the time the courts override it and the issue
returns to the legislature, Party B is in power, then the legislature
might be less inclined to involve themselves in the issue because
they do not support the statute the same way that Party A
supported the statute. An analogous example is the legal battle
over the constitutionality of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act (“Obamacare”). In 2018, Texas and nineteen other
states sued the U.S. in federal district court arguing that
Obamacare was unconstitutional. 135 The U.S. government, then
under Republican leadership, decided that it would not defend
Obamacare in court; presumably because in contrast to the
Democratic administration that passed and championed the Act,
the Republican administration did not support the Act. 136 This
demonstrates how the changing of political power can possibly
affect the level of political engagement in support of a statute.
Similarly, studies have found that there is greater legislative
debate when the issue is not politically divisive. 137
The level of judicial entrenchment may also affect the level
of legislative engagement. In a new democracy, where the court
has not had the requisite time to establish its role and validity,
overturning a statute might result in more legislative
engagement, whereas with a strong and established court, the
legislature might be less inclined to get involved. Take, for
example, the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal and its third-term
ruling. 138 In 1997, only one year after the tribunal’s creation, it
See generally Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief, Texas v.
United States, 340 F. Supp. 3d 579 (2018) (4:18-cv-00167-O) (arguing that the
individual mandate of the ACA is unconstitutional because the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act of 2017 removed the tax penalty from the individual mandate and therefore it
is no longer an exercise of Congress’ taxing power).
136
See Ariane de Vogue & Tami Luhby, Federal Judge in Texas Strikes Down
Affordable
Care
Act,
CNN
(Dec.
15,
2018),
https://www.cnn.com/2018/12/14/politics/texas-aca-lawsuit/index.html.
137 See André Bächtiger et al., The Deliberative Dimensions of Legislatures, 40
ACTA POLITICA 225, 234 (2005).
138
See Eduardo Dargent, Determinants of Judicial Independence: Lessons
From Three ‘Cases’ of Constitutional Courts in Peru (1982-2007), 41 J. LATIN AM.
STUD. 251, 269–70 (2009) (discussing the Peruvian Constitutional Tribunal case).
Similar examples in Latin America include court-packing by President Menem of
Argentina, see e.g., Mugambi Jouet, The Failed Invigoration of Argentina’s
135

Constitution: Presidential Omnipotence, Repression, Instability, and Lawlessness in
Argentina History, 39 UNIV. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 409, 446 (2008); court-
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ruled that Congress’ interpretation of the Constitution that
allowed President Alberto Fujimori to run for a third term was
unconstitutional. 139 In response to this ruling, Congress voted 5233 to dismiss the three judges who had issued the ruling. 140 They
based the removal on an allegation that the three judges had
exceeded their power by signing a document on behalf of the full
court. 141
In addition to possibly increased legislative engagement of
judicial review in new democracies, courts in these countries
might also be less willing to overturn statutes in the first place for
fear of damaging their already vulnerable positions. Chilean
courts, for example, have been very modest in their use of
judicial review, in part because when they have gotten involved in
political issues, the result has been catastrophic. 142 When the
Chilean Supreme Court ruled in 1927 that the arrest of the
Minister of Interior by the Minister of Defense was illegal, the
Minister of Defense arrested the President of the Supreme Court
and removed half of the Court’s members. 143
Given the
ambiguities and erratic role that courts may have in new
democracies and the effect this may have on legislative
engagement, the analysis presented here will focus on established
democracies.
Lastly, other parties outside of the legislature and judiciary
can also potentially affect the level of legislative engagement.
For example, the level of media interest in an issue could
potentially spur legislative engagement when there otherwise
might not have been engagement. Between 1990 and 1991, the
media in the U.K. went into a frenzy reporting about incidents of
dogs mauling people and demanded that something be done by
packing (and purging) by President Hugo Chavez in Venezuela, see, e.g., Rigging
the Rule of Law: Judicial Independence Under Siege in Venezuela, HUMAN RIGHTS

WATCH (Jun. 16, 2004), https://www.hrw.org/report/2004/06/16/rigging-rulelaw/judicial-independence-under-siege-venezuela#.
139 Dargent, supra note 138, at 269–70.
140
Calvin Sims, Peru’s Congress is Assailed Over Its Removal of Judges, N.Y.
TIMES (May 31, 1997), https://www.nytimes.com/1997/05/31/world/peru-s-congressis-assailed-over-its-removal-of-judges.html.
141

Id.

Javier Couso, The Politics of Judicial Review in Chile in the Era of
Democratic Transition, 1990–2002, 10 DEMOCRATIZATION 70, 87–89 (2003).
143 Id. at 85–86.
142
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the Government to address the problem. 144 In response, the U.K.
Parliament passed the Dangerous Dogs Act. 145 The Act is
considered by many to be poorly designed, overbroad, and an
“archetypal piece of knee-jerk nonsense.” 146 Similarly, significant
lobbying can spur the legislative branch into action and distort
legislative opinions on the issue.147 The level of engagement from
the executive branch may also affect how involved the legislature
becomes. For example, if the executive branch was the one to
initially propose and draft the legislation in question, the
executive branch will be more invested in ensuring its continued
validity. If the executive branch is more involved, it is possible
that the legislative branch will be more involved, especially the
members in the legislature of the executive’s own party. 148
Having considered the various limitations inherent in our
analysis of legislative engagement of judicial review, the next
section will cover the four principal case studies and draw
conclusions from them.
IV.

CASE STUDIES

This section uses three countries as case studies to analyze
whether weak-form judicial review provides its purported
dialogic benefit. Two case studies have strong-form judicial
review—the U.S. and India—and one case study has weak-form
judicial review, the U.K. This article chose both strong-form and
weak-form systems to demonstrate whether weak-form judicial
review creates a worthwhile increase in meaningful dialogue over
144
Iain Hollingshead, Whatever Happened to Dangerous Dogs?, GUARDIAN
(Nov. 4, 2005), https://www.theguardian.com/uk/2005/nov/05/animalwelfare.world.
145
See Hollingshead, supra note 144; Dangerous Dogs Act 1991, c. 65 (Gr.
Brit.).
146
Hollingshead, supra note 144 (The Act is considered “a classic example of
what not to do.”).
147
Cf. Kenneth W. Starr, Observations About the Use of Legislative History,
1987 DUKE L. J. 371, 377 (1987) (“It is well known that technocrats, lobbyists and
attorneys have created a virtual cottage industry in fashioning legislative history so
that the Congress will appear to embrace their particular view in a given statute.”).
148
See, e.g., Argelin Cheibub Figueiredo & Fernando Limongi, Presidential
Power, Legislative Organization, and Party Behavior in Brazil, 32 COMPAR. POL.
151, 151 (2000) (analyzing empirical data and finding that Brazilian presidents’
own proposed legislation is most often successful because the president’s party has a
high level of discipline).
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strong-form judicial review. 149
The particular cases were chosen while keeping in mind the
“most similar cases” principle outlined by Ran Hirschl. 150 This
principle suggests selecting cases that “are matched on all
variables or potential explanations that are not central to the
study, but vary in the values on the key independent and
dependent variables.” 151 In so doing, the selected cases can help
“isolat[e] the explanatory power of the key independent
variable”––here, whether the country has adopted a system of
strong- or weak-form judicial review. 152
In terms of non-key variables, the particular country case
studies were chosen because they are all generally considered to
be established democracies. 153
This article omitted less
established democracies and countries because, as previously
mentioned, the judicial and legislative branches might act
differently than in established democracies.154 In addition, the
149
The analysis does not assess a particular country before and after
implementing weak-form judicial review because the countries with weak-form
judicial review came from systems of legislative supremacy with allegedly more
legislative engagement on the issues, and thus the change over time does not speak
as strongly to whether switching to weak-form judicial review improves
constitutional dialogue.
150 See Hirschl, supra note 110, at 133–34.
151 Hirschl, supra note 110, at 134.
152 Hirschl, supra note 110, at 134.
153 See Economist Intelligence Unit, Democracy Index 2020: In sickness and in
Health,
EIU
(2020),
https://www.eiu.com/n/campaigns/democracy-index2020/?utm_source=economist-dailychart&utm_medium=anchor&utm_campaign=democracy-index2020&utm_content=anchor-1 (last visited Dec. 4, 2021). The Democracy Index
measures the state of democracy around the world and categorizes countries as full
democracies, flawed democracies, hybrid regimes, or authoritarian regimes. Id. In
2020, all four countries were considered democracies: India was ranked 53rd, the
U.S. was ranked 25th, and the United Kingdom was ranked 16th. Id. at 8–10, Also,
established democracies often provide a greater sample size in the number of times
legislatures convene and substantively engage in the policymaking process, and
therefore provide a better indicator of the dialogic benefit of the various forms of
judicial review. Cf. Jennifer Gandhi, Ben Noble, & Milan Svolik, Legislatures and
Legislative Politics Without Democracy, 53 COMPAR. POL. STUD. 1359, 1360 (2020)
(noting empirical evidence that suggests that “authoritarian legislatures meet less
frequently; when they do meet, it is often for ceremonial purposes,” and that
legislators in authoritarian regimes are not often involved in activities related to the
policymaking process).
154
Compare Stephen Gardbaum, Are Strong Constitutional Courts Always a
Good Thing for New Democracies?, 53 COLUM. J. OF TRANSNAT’L L. 285, 285 (2015)
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chosen cases within each country mostly address statutes enacted
by the legislative branch that the judicial branch subsequently
interpreted as an unlawful violation of a provision of the bill of
rights. The article chose this control because the weak-form
model of judicial review is currently only used to review
legislation for infringement upon delineated rights and
liberties.155 As a result, cases wherein the judicial branch
interpreted either statute as unlawfully infringing on other
constitutional issues or solely executive actions as infringing on
the bill of rights were not included.
In terms of key variables, these countries were chosen
because they provide an inclusive spectrum of the strength of the
judicial branch, from strongest to weakest. India has one of the
strongest judicial branches in the world, with the ability to
declare constitutional amendments unconstitutional, whereas the
judicial branch’s power in the U.K. to make declarations of
incompatibility is relatively new and the courts have historically
been rather weak. 156
This spectrum will allow deeper
investigation into the dialogic benefit of weak-form judicial
review and whether this benefit can change based on the
particular variety of weak-form judicial review selected by a
country. Further, the particular cases selected for each country
attempt to incorporate a spectrum of legislative responses,
including overriding the court’s decision, accepting the court’s
decision, and slightly modifying the suspect statute. 157 The article
turns first to the United States.

(discussing backlashes against courts in several new democracies and arguing that
adopting weak-form judicial review might ease the political tension and help
develop judicial independence), with Rosalind Dixon & David Landau,

Transnational Constitutionalism and a Limited Doctrine of Unconstitutional
Constitutional Amendment, 13 INT’L J. CONST. L. 606, 606–07 (2015) (arguing that
where a dominant political party is using constitutional amendments to retain its
hold on power, a “super-strong” form of judicial review might be warranted).
155 Gardbaum, supra note 154, at 313.
156 See Gardbaum, supra note 154, at 305.
157
Although this article had to make decisions on which cases to
include/exclude because of the inherently limited scope of the article, choosing
cases with a spectrum of legislative responses attempts to mitigate possible flaws
due to cherry-picking.
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A. United States
It is widely accepted that the United States has a system of
strong-form judicial review; however, this does not necessarily
preclude dialogue between the branches of government. 158
Decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court bind current and
subsequent parties before it, including when that party is the U.S.
government. 159 This is generally because the Constitution is
authoritative in the sense that citizens and officials alike must not
only obey provisions of the Constitution they believe to be
misguided but also interpretations of the Constitution that they
believe to be misguided. 160 Despite the strength of the judiciary,
it is also widely argued that the U.S. has a system of
departmentalism wherein other political actors, having taken an
oath to support and defend the Constitution, have a duty to
make their own independent interpretations of the
Constitution. 161 Numerous Presidents have also taken this view,
such as Thomas Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln,
Franklin Roosevelt, and Ronald Reagan. 162
Possibly
acknowledging this departmentalism, the U.S. Supreme Court
has created numerous mechanisms, such as the political question
doctrine, through which the Court can restrain its decisions and
leave room for legislative engagement. 163 Similarly, not all
Supreme Court decisions are immune from statutory reversal.
158 See Mark Tushnet, Alternative Forms of Judicial Review, 101 MICH. L. REV.
2781, 2784 (2003).
159
See Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958) (asserting that the Supreme
Court’s interpretations bind all officials).
160
See Larry Alexander & Frederick Schauer, On Extrajudicial Constitutional
Interpretation, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1359, 1361–62 (1997).
161

See id.

Barry Friedman & Erin F. Delaney, Becoming Supreme: The Federal
Foundation of Judicial Supremacy, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1138 n.2 (2011).
163
See Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 224, 228–29 (1993) (explaining that
162

there are constitutional issues “committed” to the executive or legislative branches
of government, as opposed to the judicial branch); see also Erin F. Delaney,
Analyzing Avoidance: Judicial Strategy in Comparative Perspective, 66 DUKE L. J. 1,
4 (2016) (noting that by using avoidance strategies, courts can create a delay which
may allow for dialogue among the political branches). But see Tara Leigh Grove,
The Lost History of the Political Question Doctrine, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1908, 1936–
37 (2015) (arguing that the political question doctrine is used by the Supreme
Court to solidify its supremacy over constitutional law by allowing itself to declare
which branch of government can decide which constitutional question).
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Professor Henry Monaghan argued that the Supreme Court
created a “constitutional common law” of “substantive,
procedural, and remedial rules” that are not constitutionally
required and are therefore modifiable by the legislature. 164 The
legislature has often acknowledged its role in constitutional
interpretation as well.
For example, the U.S. House of
Representatives has required that, when passing a bill of joint
resolution, Congress include a “Constitutional Authority
Statement” that declares which constitutional power Congress is
acting upon in passing the legislation. 165 This requirement is
considered to be “fundamentally a congressional interpretation
of the Constitution.” 166 This in turn allows a certain level of
dialogue over constitutional law to occur between the judiciary
and the other political branches.
Having established the
possibility for dialogue in models of strong-form judicial review,
congressional engagement in two Supreme Court rulings, U.S. v.
Stevens 167 and Citizens United v. F.E.C., 168 will now be analyzed.
1. Animal Crush Videos
In 1999, the U.S. Congress enacted into law 18 U.S.C. § 48
which made it a crime punishable by up to seven years in prison
to commercially create, sell, or possess a depiction of animal
cruelty. 169 The law was apparently enacted to prohibit animal
“crush videos,” often made for persons with an obscure sexual
fetish, wherein animals were depicted getting crushed by the bare
foot or heel of a woman. 170 “Depiction of animal cruelty,”
however, was defined as a depiction “in which a living animal is
164 Henry Monaghan, Forward, Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1, 2–3 (1975); see also YAP, supra note 72, at 79–106 (illustrating how courts in
Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore can engage in constitutional dialogue with
the legislature through sub-constitutional norms).
165
CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44729, CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY STATEMENTS AND
THE POWER OF CONGRESS: AN OVERVIEW (2019).
166

Id.

United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577 (2010).
Citizens United v F.E.C., 130 S. Ct. 876 (2010).
169
18 U.S.C. § 48(a)–(b). (Invalidated by U.S. v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577
(2010)).
170
See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1579 (2010) (discussing the legislative history
and intent behind the legislation).
167
168
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intentionally maimed, mutilated, tortured, wounded, or killed, if
such conduct is illegal under Federal law or the law of the
State.” 171 The law did not apply to depictions with “serious
religious, political, scientific, educational, journalistic, or artistic
value.” 172 Although successful at limiting the animal crush video
market, in 2010, the U.S. Supreme Court held that the law was
invalid under the First Amendment because it was overbroad,
applying to more protected speech than was necessary to fulfill
the statute’s purpose.173 For example, the law could apply to
hunting videos that were made for entertainment and sold in the
District of Columbia, where hunting is illegal. 174 Despite finding
the statute invalid, the Supreme Court implied the possibility
that a ban on only animal crush videos would be constitutional. 175
In May 2010, shortly after the Supreme Court decision, the
U.S. House of Representatives Judiciary Committee’s
Subcommittee on Crime, Terrorism, and Homeland Security
held a hearing to discuss possible legislative responses. 176
Interestingly, the panelists included not only constitutional
scholars and practitioners but also two congressmen.
Congressman Gary Peters (D-MI), who had recently introduced a
replacement animal crush bill, mentioned in his opening
statement how the Supreme Court decision “left Congress very
little room to regulate” and that Congress “must enact a new
narrowly tailored legislation that carefully parses and responds to
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinions and can survive another round of
judicial review.” 177 He noted that to make the legislation
constitutional, the new bill must be constrained to ban only
animal crush videos and the exceptions clause must be
broadened. 178 After Congressman Peters’ introductory remarks,
Congressman Elton Gallegly (R-CA) similarly discussed the need
Id. at 1582.
Id. at 1590.
173 Stevens, 130 S. Ct. at 1592.
174 Id. at 1589.
175 Id. at 1592.
176
United States v. Stevens: The Supreme Court’s Decisions Invalidating the
Crush Video Statute: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010).
177 Id. at 4 (statement of Gary C. Peters, Sen. from the State of Michigan).
178 Id. at 5.
171
172
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for a narrowly tailored replacement. In addition, he remarked:
“while I was disappointed with the Court’s ruling, I have
tremendous respect for the Court.” 179 Once the hearing was
opened up for questioning, Louie Gohmert (R-TX) asked several
questions probing where a future court could ostensibly find
“loopholes” that might make the law overbroad. 180 For example,
he asked whether the interstate commerce provision was too
broad and expressed concern over the lack of a definition for
“animal.” 181 Following the panel with Representatives Gallegly
and Peters, the Subcommittee heard from several constitutional
law scholars and practitioners who argued that crush videos
would likely fit within the definition of obscenity and therefore
fall outside the First Amendment’s protection. 182
Following the hearing, on June 22, 2010, H.R. 5566 was
introduced in the House. A mark-up session and debate were
largely uneventful. Most representatives simply mentioned that
this bill “carefully parses and responds” to the Supreme Court’s
decision 183 and that it will pass constitutional muster because it
only bans animal cruelty that is “obscene” and specifically
exempts depictions of protected categories, such as hunting. 184
Congressman James Moran (D-VA) mentioned how he disagreed
with the Supreme Court’s decision but did not provide
clarification for his reasoning.185
Following passage in the House, H.R. 5566 (now S7653) was
debated and amended in the U.S. Senate. The Senate version
contained notable changes; it specifically defined animal,
criminalized conspiracy to produce animal crush videos, and
separated the definition of a depiction of animal crush into (1)
intentional serious bodily injury to animal and (2) obscenity. 186
Id. at 25 (statement of Rep. Elton Gallegly).
Id. at 24–25 (statement of Rep. Louie Gohmert).
181 Id.
182
See, United States v. Stevens: The Supreme Court’s Decisions Invalidating
the Crush Video Statute: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime, Terrorism, and
Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 19–64 (2010).
179
180

183

Peters).
184
185

111 CONG. REC. H5790 (daily ed. Jul. 20, 2010) (statement of Rep. Gary

Id. at H5789 (daily ed. Jul. 20, 2010) (statement of Rep. Bobby Scott).
Id. at H5790 (daily ed. Jul. 20, 2010) (statement of Rep. Jim Moran).

186
111 CONG. REC. S7654 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2010) (amendment No. 4668 as
agreed to by the Senate).
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During the Senate debate, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT)
mentioned that, although Congress finds many animal crush
videos to be obscene, the definition of depiction of animal crush
was bifurcated to “respect the role that courts and juries play in
determining obscenity.” 187 Despite this, the bill nevertheless
contained a congressional finding that “many animal crush
videos are obscene in the sense that the depictions, taken as a
whole—(A) appeal to the prurient interest in sex; (B) are patently
offensive; and (C) lack serious literary, artistic, political, or
scientific value.” 188 This finding tracks the test for obscenity laid
out by the Supreme Court in Miller v. California. 189
When H.R. 5566 returned to the House, the House accepted
most of the amendment but removed the criminalization of a
conspiracy or attempt to create animal crush videos. 190 During
the congressional debate, Congressman John Conyers (D-MI)
expressed his concerns for the change by noting that
criminalizing attempts or conspiracies to create animal crush
videos is “particularly problematic with respect to the creation of
expressive materials, no matter how little redeeming value they
may have” because the “materials . . . may or may not turn out to
be obscene.” 191 After Congress reached a final agreement,
President Obama signed the Animal Crush Video Prohibition Act
of 2010 into law on December 9. 192

187
188
189

Id. at S7653.
Id. at S7654 (amendment No. 4668 as agreed to by the Senate).
See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 26 (1973) (“[a]t a minimum, prurient,

patently offensive depiction or description of sexual conduct must have serious
literary, artistic, political, or scientific value to merit First Amendment protection”).
190
Compare 111 CONG. REC. S7654 (daily ed. Sept. 28, 2010) (“It shall be
unlawful for any person to knowingly create an animal crush video, or to attempt to
conspire to do so, if”) (emphasis added), with H.R. 5566, 111th Cong. § 3 (2010)
(“It shall be unlawful for any person to knowingly create an animal crush video, if”).
191
111 CONG. REC. H7404 (daily ed. Nov. 15, 2010) (statement of Rep. John
Conyers).
192
Press Release, The White House, Statement by the Press Secretary (Dec. 9,
2010), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2010/12/09/statementpress-secretary.
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2. Corporate Campaign Finance
Standing in stark contrast to the bipartisan and
uncontroversial topic of animal crush videos is the debate about
campaign finance laws that followed in the wake of the U.S.
Supreme Court’s decision in Citizens United v. F.E.C., 558 U.S.
310 (2010). 193 The Citizens United decision, a five-to-four
ruling, removed certain restrictions on the ability of corporations
and other business entities to use their general treasury funds to
finance communications expressly advertising the election or
defeat of a certain candidate for political office. 194 The Court
held that two provisions of the Federal Election Campaign Act,
the prohibition on corporations using general treasury funds for
independent expenditures and electioneering communications,
constitute a “ban on speech” thus violating the First
Amendment. 195 The congressional response was dramatic.
The day that the Court issued its ruling, Senators Jeff
Sessions (R-AL) and Ted Kaufman (D-DE) exchanged statements
on the Senate floor outlining their views. 196 Senator Sessions
agreed with the Court’s reasoning in its issued opinion,
concurring that the decision was consistent with the Founding
Fathers’ ideals in the way it “overruled two recent precedents that
had themselves undermined and were inconsistent with this
Nation’s long tradition of protecting political speech.” 197 He also
mentioned that the decision was useful in that it showed “how far
some congressionally passed laws reach,” and continued “that
sometimes these bills reach farther [sic] than we [Congress]
intended for them to reach when [Congress] wrote them.” 198 In
contrast, Senator Kaufman decried the decision. His primary
concern was that an activist court issued the opinion that
blatantly violated stare decisis.199
Senator Kaufman also
expressed concerns that the ruling was too broad and that the
193
194
195

Citizens United v. F.E.C., 558 U.S. 310, 372 (2010).

Id. at 310.
Id. at 312.

111 CONG. REC. S108-09 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 2010).
111 CONG. REC. S108-09 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 2010) (statement of Sen. Jeff
Sessions).
198 Id. (statement of Sen. Jeff Sessions).
199 Id. at S117 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 2010) (statement of Sen. Ted Kaufman).
196
197
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Court could have restricted its decision to not-for-profit political
advocacy firms. 200 Lastly, he remarked that the decision erodes
public trust in the government because “undiluted corporate
money [can] drown out the voices of individual citizens and
corrupt the political process.” 201
Following these initial remarks, Democrats opposed to the
decision issued floor statements that became increasingly critical
of the Court. For example, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT)
remarked that he was “disappointed with the Justices,” in that
they “went beyond the proper judicial role to substitute their
preferences for the law,” and charged that several Justices were
not abiding by the statements they made under oath to the
Senate Judiciary Committee. 202 Senator Sheldon Whitehouse (DRI) concurred with several of the remarks made by Senator
Leahy, adding that the decision ignores the Founding Fathers’
original intent and that the Court ignored its proper role by
engaging in fact-finding and writing in a polemical, rather than
judicial tone. 203
In addition to floor statements, six hearings discussing the
implications and possible congressional responses to the
Supreme Court ruling were held during the 111th Congress. 204
Most of these hearings, however, focused on possible legislative
responses within the bounds of the Citizens United decision.
Although legislators voiced their opinion on the Court’s decision
during the hearings, especially during their opening statements,
they did so in broad terms, usually explaining either that political
speech is the most sacred kind of speech and that Congress
should not pass any law abridging the right to free speech, or
that speech can be regulated by Congress when it is so required.
Some also argued that corporations are not persons and that
keeping corporate money out of elections is an essential goal. 205
200
201
202

Leahy).

Id. (statement of Sen. Ted Kaufman).
Id. (statement of Sen. Ted Kaufman).

111 CONG. REC. S275 (daily ed. Jan. 28, 2010) (statement of Sen. Patrick

203
111 CONG. REC. S354–55 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2010) (statement of Sen.
Sheldon Whitehouse).
204 H.R. Rep. No. 111–492, at 24 (2010).
205
Compare Defining the Future of Campaign Finance in an Age of Supreme
Court Activism: Hearings Before the Comm. on H. Admin., 111th Cong. 2-4 (2010)
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One exception was Congressman Mel Watt (D-NC), who
explicitly declared that he was undecided on whether he agreed
with Citizens United and that he hoped to “have a more fixed
opinion” after listening to the panel witnesses. 206 In particular, he
noted that he wanted to hear from the witnesses on whether
corporations are people and whether money is speech. 207 It is
unclear if Congressman Watt was convinced one way or the other
about the issue. 208
After these floor statements and hearings on the issue,
Representative John Yarmuth (D-KY), along with twenty-seven
Democratic cosponsors, introduced a resolution “[e]xpressing
disapproval of the decision issued by the Supreme Court in
Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission.” 209
In
particular, the resolution found that the decision was incorrect
because it “allow[ed] the interests of corporations . . . to
supersede the voices of citizens of the United States in the
democratic process . . . and ha[d] a corrosive effect on the
electoral process, the cornerstone of democracy in the United
States, by separating the people from their elected
representatives.” 210 The resolution further called on Congress to
work in a bipartisan manner to “limit the influence” of
corporations in federal elections.211 Although the bill never left
committee, there were numerous efforts to limit the influence of
the court’s decision.
(statement of Sen. Dan Lungren),
with id. at 5–6 (statement of Rep. Zoe Lofgren).

First Amendment and Campaign Finance Reform After Citizens United:
Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Const., C.R., and C.L., of the H. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 8 (2010) (statement of Rep. Melvin Watt).
207 Id. at 7.
206

208
The only indications on Congressman Watt’s final view on the issue are his
subsequent votes on campaign finance legislation in the 111th Congress. From this
imperfect perspective, it appears he sided with the Court; for example, he voted
“Nay” on the DISCLOSE Act. Roll Call 391, H.R. Res. 5175, 111th Cong. (June 24,
2010), https://clerk.house.gov/evs/2010/roll391.xml.
209
H.R. Res. 1275, 111th Cong. (2010); Cosponsors: H.Res.1275—111th
Congress (2009-2010): Expressing disapproval of the decision issued by the
Supreme Court in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,
https://www.congress.gov/bill/111th-congress/houseresolution/1275/cosponsors?r=43&s=1.
210
211

Id.
Id.
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In particular, more than forty bills were introduced during
the 111th Congress that dealt with corporate campaign finance
regulation. 212 Some of this legislation attempted to act within the
bounds of the court’s decision by, for example, requiring
increased disclosures and disclaimers by corporations and other
entities engaged in independent expenditures and electioneering
communications. 213
Other legislation was likely aimed at
circumventing Citizens United by creating campaign finance
regulations that, read explicitly, would not violate the law as set
forth by the Supreme Court, but the effect would be to impose
the same speech restrictions as were in effect before the Court’s
decision.214 Additionally, during the 111th Congress, six
constitutional amendments related to campaign finance were
introduced after Citizens United. 215 These proposals differed in
substance, ranging from permitting Congress and the states to
limit political expenditures to prohibiting corporations from
funding advertising related to federal elections. 216 Other than the
212
R. Sam Garret, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R41054 CAMPAIGN FINANCE POLICY
AFTER CITIZENS UNITED V. FEDERAL ELECTION COMMISSION: ISSUES AND OPTIONS FOR
CONGRESS (2011).
213
See, e.g., Democracy is Strengthened by Casting Light on Spending in
Elections (DISCLOSE) Act, H.R. 5175, 111th Cong. (2010) (passed in House by a
vote of 219-206); S. 3295, 111th Cong. (2010) (Senate version that did not gain the
requisite vote for the cloture motion to succeed). But see “We The People?

Corporate Spending in American Elections After Citizens United” Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th CONG. 5–6 (2010) (statement of Bradley A.

Smith) (arguing that even many of the provisions of the DISCLOSE Act would be
unconstitutional under Citizens United).
214
See, e.g., H.R. 4431, 111th Cong. § 4491(a) (2010) (levying a 500% tax on
corporate campaign contributions or electioneering communications); H.R. 4487,
111th Cong. § 2 (2010) (requiring approval from majority of shareholders before
spending corporate funds on political advocacy not related to the company’s
business).
215
H.R.J. Res. 68, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R.J. Res. 74, 111th Cong. (2010);
H.R.J. Res. 84, 111th Cong. (2010); H.R.J. Res. 82, 111th Cong. (2010); S.J. Res.
28, 111th Cong. (2010); S.J. Res. 36, 111th Cong. (2010).
216 Compare H.R.J. Res. 74, 111th Cong. (2010)
Article–Section 1. The sovereign right of the people to govern
being essential to a free democracy, Congress and the States may
regulate the expenditure of funds for political speech by any
corporation, limited liability company, or other corporate entity.
Section 2. Nothing contained in this article shall be construed to
abridge the freedom of the press.,
with H.R.J. Res. 68, 111th Cong. (2010)
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DISCLOSE Act, which was passed in the House but failed in the
Senate, none of these proposals from the 111th Congress got far
in the legislative process, with almost all of them stalling in
committee. 217 The debate, however, has not stopped. Numerous
pieces of legislation and proposals to amend the Constitution
have come in subsequent Congresses, and many legislators are
still fighting on this issue to this day. 218
B. India
India provides another unique case study to examine
legislative engagement on constitutional questions brought up by
the judiciary because “the Supreme Court of India is arguably
one of the most assertive and powerful high courts” in the
world. 219 Several factors contribute to this power. First, the
Supreme Court has declared that although the legislature has the
power to alter fundamental rights through constitutional
amendments, the Court has the power to declare constitutional
amendments unconstitutional if they violate the basic structure of
the Constitution as originally conceived.220 Second, the Supreme
Article–No corporation or labor organization may use any of its
operating funds or any other funds from its general treasury to
make any payment for any advertisement in connection with a
campaign for election for federal office, without regard to
whether or not the advertisement expressly advocates the election
or defeat of a specified candidate in the election.
217
See generally Brennen Center for Justice, Summary of Federal Election
Reform
Legislation
Introduced
in
the
111th
Congress,
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/analysis/Summary%20of%20Electio
n%20Reform%20Legislation%20111th%20Congress.pdf (last modified Jun. 7,
2010).
218
See, e.g., H.R. Res. 1, 117th Cong. (2021) (“For the People Act of 2021”
aimed at, inter alia, “reduc[ing] the influence of big money in politics”).
219
Manoj Mate, The Rise of Judicial Governance in the Supreme Court of
India, 33 B.U. INT’L L. J. 169, 171 (2015); see also Manish Tewari & Rekha Saxena,

The Supreme Court of India: The Rise of Judicial Power and the Protection of
Federalism, in COURTS IN COUNTRIES: FEDERALIST OR UNITARISTS? 223, 224

(Nicholas Aroney et al eds., 2017) (discussing how the strength of the judiciary in
India is in part “due to the emergence of divided governments produced by India’s
immense cultural, regional, and social diversities and the rise of a state-based
multiparty system”).
220
See CHINTAN CHANDRACHUD, BALANCED CONSTITUTIONALISM: COURTS AND
LEGISLATURES IN INDIA AND THE UNITED KINGDOM 46–47 (2017) (referencing
Kesavananda Bharati v. State of Kerala, A.I.R. 1973 S.C. 1461 (1973) (India))
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Court created public interest litigation (PIL), wherein an
individual with no particular interest in the litigation can file a
petition claiming certain rights have been violated, which the
Court will grant if there is a large public interest at stake. 221
These petitions are usually directed at “government illegality and
statutory noncompliance,” often in the context of human rights
abuses.222 As a result of the basic structure doctrine and PIL, the
Court has asserted itself into traditionally legislative or executive
arenas. For example, the Court has secured control over judicial
appointments,
interfered
in
governmental
corruption
investigations, and developed policy decisions in topic areas
ranging from environmental policy to education. 223 Despite the
judiciary’s strength, the legislature still wields power that gives it
opportunities to potentially engage in dialogue with the courts.
Under Article 368 of the Indian Constitution, the legislature may
amend the Constitution with a majority vote of each of the
Houses wherein at least two-thirds of each House are present at
the vote. 224 This amendment power can be used to alter
fundamental rights so long as they do not alter the Constitution’s
basic structure. 225 In addition, the legislature, through Article
31B and with the majority requirements for a constitutional
amendment, can put legislation in the “Ninth Schedule.” 226 Acts
in the Ninth Schedule apply even if they are found to conflict
with other fundamental rights found in Part III of the
Constitution. 227 Although both of these amendment processes are
still restricted by the basic structure of the Constitution, they
nevertheless provide a means for the legislature to respond to the
(although not precisely defined, subsequent cases have illuminated that the
following concepts are part of the basic structure of the Constitution: “the
supremacy
of
the
Constitution, secularism, the
sovereignty
of
India, federalism, judicial review, the limited power to amend the Constitution, and
free and fair elections”).
221 See Manoj Mate, Two Paths to Judicial Power: The Basic Structure Doctrine
and Public Interest Litigation in Comparative Perspective, 12 SAN DIEGO INT’L L. J.
175, 191–209 (2010).
222 Id. at 191, 196.
223 Id. at 177.
224 India Const. art. 368, cl. 2.
225
226
227

Id.

India Const. art. 31B.

Id.
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judiciary in a country with one of the strongest high courts in the
world. 228
1. Election Disclosures
In response to a growing body of evidence indicating high
levels of corruption in the Indian government, media and civil
society groups led a push for electoral and governmental
accountability reforms.229
Prodded by this movement, the
government undertook a study to investigate possible reforms to
“mak[e] the electoral process more fair, transparent, and
equitable . . . [a]nd to reduce . . . the . . . distortions and evils that
crept into the Indian electoral system” 230 The result was a report
by the Law Commission of India that recommended, inter alia,
that candidates for public office be required to disclose financial
assets and prior criminal records. 231 When the government failed
to implement these measures, the Association for Democratic
Reforms filed a PIL claim in Delhi High Court asking it to direct
the
Election
Commission
(EC)
to
implement
the
recommendations of the Law Commission report. 232 The case
eventually reached the Indian Supreme Court, where the Court
ruled in May 2002 that voters had a right to this information and
reiterated that the court had the power to issue directions to the
EC until the legislature stepped in and passed a satisfactory
law. 233 In so holding, the court equated the fundamental right of
freedom of speech and expression found in Article 19(1) of the
Indian Constitution with the “right to know,” establishing that
voting is a type of speech and votes cast by uninformed voters
would be “meaningless” and thus would not satisfy the freedom
of speech guarantees. 234 As a result, the EC was required to
228
See generally CHANDRACHUD, supra note 220, at 31–58 (discussing
fundamental rights amendments and Ninth Schedule amendments and their use in
responding to the courts).
229 Mate, supra note 221, at 192.
230
Law Comm’n of India, Reform of the Electoral Laws, Report No. 170 (May
1999).
231
232
233

(India).
234

Id.
See Mate, supra note 221, at 193.

Union of India v. Ass’n for Democratic Reforms, (2002) 5 S.C.C. 294, 12, 14

Id. at 16.
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implement certain disclosure requirements at the outset of a
candidate’s nomination for election, namely: (1) past convictions,
acquittals, discharges, and pending criminal cases; (2) assets and
liabilities of the candidate and his or her family; and (3)
educational qualifications. 235
With nearly all political parties opposed to the court’s
decision, the government began to analyze possible responses,
and the Ministry of Law and Justice undertook “wide-ranging
consultations with all the political parties.” 236 After allegedly
reaching consensus, the President promulgated an ordinance on
August 24, 2002, that claimed to override much of the court’s
decision.237 After this promulgation, the Lok Sabha took up the
issue of passing a law to formalize many aspects of the President’s
ordinance.238
A debate on the proposed bill in the Lok Sabha took place
on December 17, 2002. During the debate, many legislators
expressed respect for the judiciary but lamented how the
judiciary treats the legislature, finding that this judicial activism
risks harming the respect and power of the legislature. 239 In
235

Id. at 20–21.

India, 13th Lok Sabha, Combined Discussion on the Statutory Resolution
Regarding Disapproval of Representation of the People (Amendment) Ordinance,
2002 and the Representation of the People (Amendment) Bill, 2002 (Dec. 17,
2002), at 2 [hereinafter Lok Sabha Debate] (statement of U. Cabinet Minister Ravi
236

Shankar Prasad).

237
Lok Sabha Debate, supra note 236, at 2 (statement of Mem. of Parl. Pawan
Kumar Bansal). Section 33B of the ordinance watered down the disclosure
requirements included in the May 2002 court order and, mirroring the subsequent
legislation formalizing the ordinance, stated:
Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or
order of any court or any direction, order or any other
instruction issued by the Election Commission, no candidate shall
be liable to disclose or furnish any such information, in respect of
his election which is not required to be disclosed or furnished
under this Act or the rules made thereunder.
Representation of the People (Amendment) Ordinance, § 33B (2002) (India).
238
Ujjwal Kumar Singh, India, in ELECTORAL PROCESSES AND GOVERNANCE IN
SOUTH ASIA 178, 188 (Dushyantha Mendis ed., 2007) (establishing that Lok Sabha,
or House of the People, is the lower House of India’s Parliament).
239
See, e.g., Lok Sabha Debate, supra note 236, at 3–5 (statement of Mem. of
Parl. Priya Ranjan Dasmunsi)
I have all regards for the Judiciary . . . [and] I am not questioning
the bona fide of our judicial institutions, namely the Supreme
Court of India . . . But in the last few years a tendency has
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addition to these remarks, and despite the support behind the
bill from the government, many legislators disagreed on the
scope of the bill. 240 Member Priya Ranjan Dasmunsi, speaking for
himself and on behalf of the Indian National Congress Party,
disapproved of the bill because it did not go far enough to
promote transparent elections. 241
In particular, Dasmunsi
thought that in contrast to the proposed legislation wherein the
required disclosures are to be made upon taking office, the
disclosures should be required at the start of the election to “let
the electorate know who I am.” 242 He also contended the
government’s bill, did not actually promote electoral
transparency. 243 Later in the debate, the Minister of Law and
Justice, somewhat frustrated by Dasmuni’s arguments, explained
that a consensus was reached through informal deliberation in
July and August with the political parties that the disclosures
would occur post-election. 244
In contrast to Dasmunsi, Member Somnath Chatterjee,
representing the Communist Party of India, voiced support for
the bill. 245 He disagreed with Dasmunsi’s position that disclosures
should be made before the election because corruption “comes
developed on the part of the Judiciary to project to the nation as
if the Parliament is not acting . . . Now, if this tendency on the
part of the Judiciary is encouraged . . . then I am afraid the
supremacy of the Parliament, the sanctity of the Parliament, the
will of the people would be interfered with in a different
chamber, which I feel is not a good thing to happen.;
Lok Sabha Debate, supra note 236, at 15 (statement of Mem. of Parl. Shri Somnath
Chatterjee) (“[W]ith all my respect to the judiciary . . . and everybody who hold
different opinions, which I also respect, but standing here I must assert the
supremacy of the Parliament to legislate on behalf of the people. We cannot give
this up.”).
240
Lok Sabha Debate, supra note 236, at 3 (statement of Mem. of Parl. Priya
Ranjan Dasmunsi).
241 Lok Sabha Debate, supra note 236, at 3–5 (statement of Mem. of Parl. Priya
Ranjan Dasmunsi).
242
Lok Sabha Debate, supra note 236, at 2 (statement of Mem. of Parl. Priya
Ranjan Dasmunsi).
243
Lok Sabha Debate, supra note 236, at 2 (statement of Mem. of Parl. Priya
Ranjan Dasmunsi).
244
See, Lok Sabha Debate, supra note 236, at 26 (statement of Mem. of Parl.
Priya Ranjan Dasmunsi).
245
Lok Sabha Debate, supra note 236, at 1 (statement of Mem. of Parl.
Somnath Chatterjee).
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after you are elected” and because it would unjustifiably prejudice
voters against, for example, those without education, those who
have been subject to frivolous lawsuits, and those with substantial
assets. 246 Chatterjee reinforced his position by referring to the
history of the Constituent Assembly, which explicitly rejected the
idea of educational qualifications for office.247 To deal with
criminals running for office, he claimed that, instead of requiring
disclosures at the start of elections, the various political parties
should do their own research into candidates’ backgrounds and
pledge not to nominate any criminals. 248 Despite opposite
positions, Chatterjee nonetheless exhibited respect for opposing
views, acknowledging that others “are entitled to hold their view”
and that “there can be always differences of opinions.”249
After two hours of debate and further statements from
multiple sides of the issue, the Deputy-Speaker of the Lok Sabha
moved to vote on the bill and its amendments. 250 Member Pawan
Kumar Bansal attempted to speak, but the Deputy-Speaker
refused, stating that there was an agreed fixed time to discuss the
bill and that time had passed.251 Bansal complained that the Lok
Sabha “should not rush through legislation like this,” but his
concerns went unanswered.252
A vote was held, and the
amendments were not approved, though the bill in its original
form was approved. 253

Lok Sabha Debate, supra note 236, at 1 (statement of Mem. of Parl.
Somnath Chatterjee). See also Lok Sabha Debate, supra note 236, at 2 (statement of
Manda Jagannath) (establishing that Member Manda Jagannath, on behalf of the
Telugu Desam Party, largely agreed with Chatterjee and announced support for the
bill.)
247
Lok Sabha Debate, supra note 236, at 13 (statement of Mem. of Parl.
Somnath Chatterjee).
248
Lok Sabha Debate, supra note 236, at 14 (statement of Mem. of Parl.
Somnath Chatterjee).
249
Lok Sabha Debate, supra note 236, at 16 (statement of Mem. of Parl.
Somnath Chatterjee).
250 Lok Sabha Debate, supra note 236, at 25.
251 Lok Sabha Debate, supra note 236, at 25 (statement of Mem. of Parl. Pawan
Kumar Bansal).
252 Lok Sabha Debate, supra note 236, at 25 (statement of Mem. of Parl. Pawan
Kumar Bansal).
253 Lok Sabha Debate, supra note 236, at 28–37.
246
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Following approval by the Lok Sabha, the bill was sent to the
Rajya Sabha. 254 Members of the Rajya Sabha debated the
proposed bill on December 19, 2002.255 The debate was of a
similar quantity and quality as the debate in the Lok Sabha. 256
The debate lasted for over three hours and over fifteen members,
given ten minutes each, spoke about their views on the issue. 257
Most of the remarks were substantive, introducing logic,
information, and were in the same vein as the remarks made in
the Lok Sabha. Following the debate, the Rajya Sabha approved
the bill. 258 After the signature of the president, it became law. 259
The most notable provision of the new law was Section 33B
that declared “[n]otwithstanding anything contained in any
judgment . . . of any court . . . no candidate shall be liable to
disclose or furnish any such information . . . which is not required
to be disclosed or furnished under this Act.” 260 This provision
nullified the requirements imposed by the Supreme Court and
replaced them with new requirements, which differed in a few
key respects from the requirements imposed by the Supreme
Court. 261 One of the most important differences is that the final
law required only disclosure of assets and liabilities after
election. 262 In addition, under the new law, the candidates need
254
The Rajya Sabha is the upper house of the Parliament of India. Dr.
Yogendranarian, The Upper House of Indian Parliament, RAHYA SABHA (Feb.
2005), https://rajyasabha.nic.in/rsnew/practice_procedure/book1.asp.
255
See India, 197th Rajya Sabha, Debate on Statutory Resolution Seeking

Disapproval of the Representation of the People (Amendment) Ordinance, 2002
and The Representation of the People (Third Amendment) Bill, 2002 (Dec. 19,

2002),
https://rsdebate.nic.in/bitstream/123456789/86666/1/PD_197_19122002_22_p206_
p267_20.pdf [hereinafter Rajya Sabha Debate].
256
Compare Lok Sabha Debate, supra note 236, and Rajya Sabha Debate,
supra note 255.
257
Compare Lok Sabha Debate, supra note 236, and Rajya Sabha Debate,
supra note 255.
258 Rajya Sabha Debate, supra note 255, at 263–67.
259
Passage of Legislative Proposals in Parliament, LOK SABHA,
http://loksabhaph.nic.in/Legislation/Legislation.aspx (last visited Nov. 13, 2021).
260
Representation of the People (Third) Amendment Act, 2002, No. 4 Acts of
Parliament, 2002 (India).
261 See Singh, supra note 238, at 187–88 tbl.8.1 (providing a breakdown of the
major differences between the Supreme Court requirements and the law passed by
the legislature).
262 See Singh, supra note 238, at 196–97 tbl.8.1.
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only disclose: (1) criminal convictions with a sentence of one year
or more, (2) pending criminal cases with a possible sentence of at
least two years, and (3) assets of the candidate and his or her
family. 263 In contrast, the Supreme Court’s order had required
disclosures of education, liabilities, and criminal acquittals and
convictions regardless of the sentence.264
Through another PIL, the Supreme Court was given a
chance to review this new law. It found that Section 33B, which
invalidated the court’s initial requirements, was unconstitutional
and thus void. 265 The Court declared that it has the right to
review the legislation for compliance with constitutional
principles and with prior guidance set out by the court, and thus
Section 33B’s blanket ban on the Court’s prior order was
impermissible. 266
The Court then analyzed the new law’s
requirements. It found that the new law’s requirements for
disclosure of assets and liabilities were not sufficient and that the
EC must implement the conditions the Court had originally put
forth, including that disclosures must be made at the time of
filing the nomination. 267 The Court did, however, agree that the
new law’s removal of educational requirements and limitations on
disclosure of criminal records was mostly acceptable. 268 The EC
implemented the Court’s order in April 2003 and the orders have
governed subsequent elections.269
C. United Kingdom
The Human Rights Act of 1998 (“UK HRA”) is the primary
vehicle through which weak-form judicial review has been
adopted in the U.K.. 270 Coming into force on October 2, 2000,
the UK HRA is a statutory bill of rights that incorporates most of
the rights included in the European Convention on Human
Representation of the People (Third) Amendment Act, 2002, No. 4 Acts of
Parliament, 2002 (India).
264 See Singh, supra note 238, at 196–97 tbl.8.1.
265 People’s Union for Civil Liberties v. Union of India (2003) 2 S.C.R. 529.
266 Id. at 12–13.
267 Id. at 18.
268 Id. at 20.
269 Mate, supra note 221, at 195.
270 See UK HRA, supra note 85; see infra Part II C.
263
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Rights (ECHR) and makes them enforceable in U.K. courts. 271
The Act binds courts and the executive to the rights contained in
the ECHR but does not bind the Parliament. 272 Instead, the Act
protects ECHR rights from parliamentary encroachment through
Sections 3, 4, 10, and 19. First, Section 19 requires a Minister in
charge of a bill to either make a statement declaring the bill’s
compatibility with ECHR rights or make a statement explaining
that the Government nevertheless wishes to proceed with the bill
absent a declaration of compatibility.273 Second, Section 3
requires courts to interpret legislation “as far as it is possible” in a
way that complies with ECHR rights. 274 If courts are unable to do
this, they may use Section 4, which allows courts at the level of
the High Court or higher to declare that legislation is
incompatible with ECHR rights, 275 such a declaration of
incompatibility (DOI) does not affect the continuing validity and
enforcement of a statute and is not binding on parties in the
case. 276 Lastly, under Section 10, the Government may enact
remedial orders which can either (1) amend primary legislation,
or (2) amend or repeal subordinate legislation, that was the
subject of the DOI.277 The Government and the legislature,
however, are not required to act and may ignore the DOI. 278
Although the Government and legislature have the power to
ignore DOIs, the Government has adopted both a “policy of
responding to all DOIs in some way” and a procedure through
which to do so. 279 The Government established the Human Rights
271
UK HRA, supra note 85, at
§ 1 (UK), available at
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/section/1.
272
UK HRA, supra note 85, at
§ 6(3) (UK), available at
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/section/6.
273 UK HRA, supra note 85, at §§ 19(1)(a)–(b).
274 UK HRA, supra note 85, at § 3(1).
275 UK HRA, supra note 85, at §§ 4(2), (5).
276 UK HRA, supra note 85, at § 6.
277
UK HRA, supra note 85, at §§ 10(2)–(3). Remedial orders can be made
either through the normal legislative procedure of a vote in both Houses of
Parliament, or, in “urgent cases,” without a vote. UK HRA, supra note 85, at sched.
2. If an urgent remedial order is in effect but both Houses do not approve of it by
vote within 120 days, the urgent remedial order lapses. UK HRA, supra note 85, at
sched. 2.
278
UK HRA, supra note 85, at §§ 10(2)–(3) (UK), available at
https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1998/42/section/10
279 SATHANAPALLY, supra note 5, at 148.
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Unit of the Ministry of Justice and charged it with litigating all
DOIs and communicating with the Joint Committee on Human
Rights (JCHR), a committee drawn from both Houses of
Parliament tasked with handling issues of human rights. 280 The
JCHR, in turn, communicates these issues to the broader
legislature and is responsible for drafting remedial orders. 281
Having outlined the particular mechanisms of weak-form judicial
review in the U.K., parliamentary engagement with two
declarations of incompatibility, R (on the application of Morris) v
Westminster City Council and R (Thompson & JF) v Secretary of
State for the Home Department, will now be analyzed.
1. Social Housing Entitlement
Under the U.K.’s Housing Act of 1996, British citizens who
are homeless are entitled to housing assistance. 282 In addition,
priority for assistance is given to those who, inter alia, are
pregnant or reside with dependent children. 283 Section 185(4) of
the Act, however, also provides that “a person from abroad who is
not eligible for housing assistance shall be disregarded in
determining . . . whether a person . . . has a priority need for
accommodation.” 284 As a result, a homeless single mother with
British citizenship by descent, whose child was not eligible for
housing assistance because the child was not a British citizen, was
determined not to have a priority need.285 This mother brought
suit claiming that Section 185(4) violated Section 14 of the
ECHR, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of national
origin. 286 The England and Wales Court of Appeals found that
Section 185(4) was disproportionate to the U.K.’s goal of
preventing “benefit tourism” and thus declared Section 185(4)
incompatible with the ECHR prohibition of discrimination based

SATHANAPALLY, supra note 5, at 135–36.
SATHANAPALLY, supra note 5, at 159–62.
282 Housing Act 1996, c. 7 (Eng. & Wales).
283 Id. § 189.
284 Id. § 185(4).
285 R. (on the application of Morris) v. Westminster City Council (No. 3) [2005]
EWCA Civ. 1184, [1].
286 Id. at [4]–[5].
280
281
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on national origin. 287
Five months after the DOI, on March 2, 2006, the JHCR
informed the Government they did not intend to appeal the
decision and that the Secretary of State is in the process of
determining “how to remedy the incompatibility.” 288 On April 20,
2006, the Government informed the JHCR that it had not yet
decided whether to repeal or amend Section 185(4) and that the
Government needed to consult with other Government
departments.289 After not hearing from the Government, the
JHCR reached out to the Government on January 23, 2007,
asking if the Government intended to propose a remedy.290 On
February 27, 2007, the Government responded, noting that it was
“very difficult to identify a compatible solution that will continue
to deliver the Government’s policy on access to social housing.” 291
Then, on April 13, 2007, the Government wrote the JCHR
reporting that the Government intended to propose an
amendment placing housing authorities under “a new interim
duty to secure accommodation for the applicant and all
household members for a temporary period in order to give
them an opportunity to regularise their immigration status.” 292
The JHCR voiced a concern that this amendment would not
remedy the incompatibility. 293 The Government then withdrew
this proposal and indicated that the issue was being
287 R. (on the application of Morris) v. Westminster City Council (No. 3) [2005]
EWCA Civ. 1184, [45]–[48]. A second case dealing with a British husband with a
non-British pregnant wife, reached the same conclusion and also issued a DOI; see
also R (on the application of Gabaj) v. First Secretary of State (unreported) 28 Mar.
2006 (Administrative Court).
288 Letter from Alan Edwards, Homeless and Hous. Support, Off. of the Deputy
PM, to the Joint Comm. on Hum. Rts. (Mar. 2, 2006) (on file with Joint Comm.
Hum. Rts).
289
J. COMM. HUM. RTS, HL 128/HC 728, SIXTEENTH REPORT OF SESSION 200607: MONITORING THE GOVERNMENT’S RESPONSE TO COURT JUDGMENTS FINDING
BREACHES OF HUMAN RIGHTS 44 (2007).
290
291

Id.
Id. at 44–45 (quoting letter from Yvette Cooper, Member of Parliament,

Minister for Housing and Planning, Dep’t for Cmtys. and Local Gov’t, to Joint
Comm. Hum. Rts. (Feb. 27, 2007) (on file with Joint Comm. Hum. Rts.).
292 Id. at 45–46 (quoting letter from Yvette Cooper, Member of Parliament,
Minister for Housing and Planning, Dep’t for Cmtys. and Local Gov’t, to Joint
Comm. Hum. Rts (Apr. 13, 2007) (on file with Joint Comm. Hum. Rts).
293 Id. at 46.
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reexamined. 294
On January 24, 2008,
MP Andrew Love, noting the
Government’s lack of response to the DOI and the importance of
stopping the discrimination, brought an amendment that would
directly repeal Section 184(5). 295
Under-Secretary for the
Department of Communities and Local Government, Iain
Wright, responded that “simply repealing Section 184(5) is not
the answer” and reassured MP Love that the Government is
dealing with the issue and “will introduce a remedy as soon as [it]
can.” 296
With this reassurance, MP Love withdrew his
amendment. 297 The Government, however, failed to introduce a
remedy, and in an April 2008 report, the JCHR again noted its
disappointment. 298 In particular, the JCHR stated that they were
“concerned at the time which the Government has taken to reach
a settled policy on this issue” and that “[i]f the Government
intends to allow the incompatibility to stand … it should make
their position clear.” 299 In addition, the JCHR proposed its own
amendment repealing Section 185(4). 300
Finally, in June 2008, almost three years after the initial
DOI, the Government introduced amendments aimed at
remedying the incompatibility during the Housing and
Regeneration Bill’s Committee stage in the House of Lords. 301
The Government only provided one day’s notice of the proposed
amendments to the JCHR, and thus the JCHR did not have time
to adequately respond. 302 The amendments did not repeal the
provision but instead provided that when non-British dependents
were counted in the priority analysis, the housing authorities
would only have to arrange for private, not public, rented
294 J. COMM. HUM. RTS, HL 95/HC 501, SEVENTEENTH REPORT OF SESSION 200708: LEGISLATIVE SCRUTINY: 1) EMPLOYMENT BILL; 2) HOUSING AND REGENERATION
BILL; 3) OTHER BILLS 24 (2008) [hereinafter JCHR 17TH HOUSING REPORT].
295 Jan. 24, 2008, Public Bill Committee, Hansard HC cols. 521–22.
296 Id. cols. 522–23.
297
298

Id.
Id.

JCHR 17TH HOUSING REPORT, supra note 294, at 24.
JCHR 17TH HOUSING REPORT, supra note 294, at 24.
301
J. COMM. HUM. RTS, HL 173/HC 1078, THIRTY-FIRST REPORT OF SESSION
2007–08: MONITORING THE GOV’T’S RESPONSE TO HUM RTS JUDGMENTS: ANNUAL
REPORT 36 (2008) [hereinafter JCHR 31ST HOUSING REPORT].
302 See JCHR 31ST HOUSING REPORT, supra note 301, at 36.
299
300
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accommodation for one year. 303
Notably, several legislators prodded the Government on the
amendments. In a House of Lords debate on July 9, 2008, the
Earl of Onslow noted that the Government’s amendments seem
“to several of us to continue to be discriminatory” because
families with mixed nationalities would not be “on a par with
someone whose entire family had completely normal immigrant
status.” 304 He further noted that it is “liable to fall foul of the
lawyer and the courts” and that it warrants “serious
consideration.” 305 After a lengthy response from the Minister on
why the Government believes it strikes the right balance, the Earl
withdrew his amendment. 306
After approval by the House of Lords and on return to the
House of Commons, the amendments received attention from
some MPs. Several MPs mentioned their concern about how the
amendments were still discriminatory because by restricting the
provision of accommodation to “private rented accommodation,”
they were increasing the cost of accepting the offered
accommodation, potentially reducing the ability of those
homeless people to actually accept the offer. 307 In response to
these concerns, the Minister simply noted that the amendments
“strike a fair balance between the rights of migrants who come to
this country with no claim to public funds and the interests of UK
taxpayers” and that he would “look into” the concerns mentioned
by the MPs. 308
Unfortunately, the overall discussion was quite limited due to
the size of the bill that the amendments were a part of and the
limited time frame in which it was considered. Several MPs
lamented this fact; for example, stating that “having 717
amendments to the [b]ill since Second Reading does not make
for particularly good scrutiny” and noting that they felt some
“frustration” in not being able to “consider the amendments . . .

303
304
305
306
307
308

See JCHR 31ST HOUSING REPORT, supra note 301, at 36–37.

703 PARL. DEB HL (2008) col. 815–16 (statement of The Earl of Onslow).

Id.
Id. at col. 821.

479 Parl Deb HC (2008) (UK) cols. 611–12.

Id. at col. 612 (statement of Mem. of Parl. Iain Wright).
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in detail.” 309 They similarly mentioned their displeasure with the
time it took for the Government to respond to the DOI and with
the substantive problems of the Government’s amendments. 310
For example, one MP claimed that “the proposal is sticking
plaster; it is not a panacea.” 311 Nevertheless, the House of
Commons approved the bill, and the Housing and Regeneration
Act 2008 became law after receiving royal assent.
In the JCHR’s report after the passage of the Housing and
Regeneration Act 2008, they reasserted their concerns over the
new provisions. They claimed that although the provisions
remedied the clear incompatibility declared by the courts, the
new provisions might still be incompatible. 312 The JCHR based
this view on the fact that although the Government justified the
continued distinction (“resources available for long term social
housing”), the Government had not explained why the means
taken to advance this justification were proportional to the
continued distinction based on national origin. 313 As a result, the
new provisions did not “entirely remove the risk that [the]
domestic courts, or the ECtHR, will find a further violation of the
right to enjoy respect for private and family life without
unjustified discrimination.” 314
2. Sex Offender Registration
Under Sections 82, 83, and 86 of the Sexual Offences Act of
2003, anyone who is convicted of a sexual offense and sentenced
to more than 30 months in prison has a duty, upon release from
prison, to notify the police of where they live and where they
travel abroad. 315 This notification requirement persists for the
rest of their lives, and there is no provision in the Sexual
Offenses Act upon which to challenge the notification

309
Id. at cols. 614–15 (statements of Mem. of Parl. Stewart Jackson and Mem.
of Parl. Lembit Öpik).
310
311
312
313
314
315

Id.
Id. at col. 614 (statement of Mem. of Parl. Stewart Jackson).
JCHR 31ST HOUSING REPORT, supra note 301, at 38–39.
JCHR 31ST HOUSING REPORT, supra note 301, at 38–39.
JCHR 31ST HOUSING REPORT, supra note 301, at 39.

Sexual Offences Act 2003, c. 42, §§ 82, 83, 86 (Eng. & Wales).
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requirement. 316 Two suits were brought in court that claimed that
the indefinite notification provision was a disproportionate
impediment of the right to respect privacy under Article 8 of the
ECHR. 317 The lower court agreed and issued a DOI. 318 The
Government publicly disagreed with the ruling and appealed the
case to the Supreme Court which, on April 21, 2010, affirmed the
lower court’s ruling. 319
On February 16, 2011, the House of Commons debated the
court decision.320 The Secretary of State for the Home
Department, Theresa May, spoke on behalf of the Government. 321
She noted that the Government was “disappointed and appalled
by that ruling” and that it would “make the minimum possible
changes to the law in order to comply with the ruling.” 322 In the
following question-and-answer period, MP Jack Straw pressed
May on the available Government responses.323 In particular, he
noted that “there is absolutely no obligation . . . to change the
law one bit” and that “[i]t would be entirely lawful . . . to say that
the existing regime will continue without any amendment.” 324 In
response, May simply remarked that “Parliament will have the
final decision on what happens.” 325 When pressed again on the
issue by MP Barry Gardiner, May responded that the
Government has “no further right of appeal” and that it is
introducing “a tough set of measures that will address the
issue.” 326 In other answers, she also noted that the Government
“do[es] have to make a change” and that legislation keeps getting
316

See id.

F & Anor, R (on the application of) v. Secretary of State for the Home
Department [2008] EWHC 3170 (QB).
317

Id.
See R (on the application of F (by his litigation friend F)) and Thompson
(FC) v. Sec’y of State for the Home Dept. [2010] UKSC 17, [58]; see SATHANAPALLY,
supra note 5, at 215 (noting that even Prime Minister David Cameron publicly
318
319

stated that the ruling “[flies] completely in the face of common sense.”).
320 523 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2011) col. 959.
321
322
323
324

Id.
Id. (statement of Sec’y of St. for the Home Dept. Theresa May).
Id. at col. 963 (statement of Mem. of Parl. Jack Straw).
Id. (statement of Mem. of Parl. Jack Straw).

325 523 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2011) col. 963 (statement of Sec’y of St. for the
Home Dept. Theresa May).
326 Id. at col. 967 (statement of Sec’y of St. for the Home Dept. Theresa May).
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“overturned” by the courts. 327
Despite these two instances, most of the debate consisted of
MPs complaining about the decision and asserting that the courts
continuously put the “rights of bad people over the rights of
good people” and that “if one offender gets off the sex offenders
register, it is one too many.” 328 The Government agreed,
restating that despite the plan to comply minimally with the
decision, further amendments would be made to the sexual
offense register to make it tougher. 329 One minor exception was
when MP Peter Lilley mentioned that there “is some merit in the
Court’s decision.” 330 May responded, however, simply by noting
the widespread concern about a court making “a judgment that
puts the right of a perpetrator above the rights of the public and
individuals victims.” 331 No mention was made as to the judicial
reasoning behind the Court’s decision or to the fact that the
rights of the public are not put below the rights of the
perpetrator if the perpetrator is not a risk to society.
Following this debate, on June 14, 2011, the Government
introduced a remedial order addressing the DOI. 332 The draft
remedial order allowed convicted sex offenders to petition the
police to be removed from the register fifteen years after
completing his or her sentence.333 The JCHR then released their
report on the draft order stating the belief that the draft order
would not sufficiently remedy the incompatibility. 334
In
particular, the JCHR compared the draft procedure to the
procedures of other EU countries and noted that the court
emphasized the importance of “review by an independent and

327

May).

Id. cols. 961, 969 (statements of Sec’y of St. for the Home Dept. Theresa

328
Id. col. 969 (statement of Mem. of Parl. Philip Hollobone); id. col. 965
(statement of Mem. of Parl. Ian Paisley).
329 523 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2011) col. 962 (statement of Sec’y of St, for the
Home Dept. Theresa May Theresa May).
330 Id. col. 962 (statement of Mem. of Parl. Peter Lilley).
331 Id. cols. 962–63 (statement of Sec’y of St, for the Home Dept. Theresa May).
332
529 Parl Deb HC (6th Ser.) (2011) (written statement of Under-Sec’y of St.
of Home Dept. Lynne Featherstone).
333

Id.

J. COMM. HUM. RTS, HL 200/HC 1549, NINETEENTH REP. OF SESSION 201012: PROPOSAL FOR THE SEXUAL OFFENCES ACT 2003 (REMEDIAL) ORDER 2011 (2011).
334
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impartial body.” 335 The JCHR concluded that review by the
police would not be an “appropriate tribunal” and recommended
that the draft order be revised to provide for review by a high
court, or that the review by the police be appealable to the high
courts. 336 In addition, the JCHR noted that the remedial order
should make clear that the review should strike a balance
between the risk to the public and the restriction on the right to
privacy.337
The JCHR also discussed procedural concerns they had with
the Government’s handling of the issue. In particular, the JCHR
noted that the remedial order process was designed to be a
procedure through which the Government can quickly remedy a
breach of a right and that the Government abused this process by
introducing a draft that would not remove the incompatibility. 338
They also disapproved of a “number of potentially misleading
statements [that] have been made in the press about the scope of
this judgment,” and that the Court’s decision did not put the
rights of sex offenders above the public, but merely required that
the offenders allowed to have their situation reviewed and
conduct a balancing test. 339
After considering this report, the Government introduced a
revised version of the remedial order on March 5, 2012. 340 The
revised order provided for review by the police and appeal to a
magistrate court. 341 The Government stated that it did not agree
with the JCHR’s interpretation that the decision required review
by courts “because the court was not addressing the issue of the
nature of the decision maker but whether it is possible to make a
reliable assessment of the risk of a person committing a further
sexual offence.” 342 The JCHR’s response acknowledged that the
second draft remedial order did remove the incompatibility but
335
336
337
338
339
340

Id. at 14–15.
Id. at 15–16.
Id. at 17–19.
Id. at 24.
Id. at 12–13.
See SEC’Y ST, HOME DEP’T, THE GOV’T RESPONSE

TO THE NINETEENTH
FOR THE SEXUAL

REPORT OF THE J. COMM. HUM. RTS SESSION 2010-12: PROPOSAL
OFFENCES ACT 2003 (REMEDIAL) ORDER 2011 (Mar. 5, 2012) (UK).
341 Id. at 1.
342 Id. at 3.
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stated that there might now need to be an additional enhanced
review because concurrent amendments to the Sexual Offences
Act made the registration requirement more onerous in other
aspects. 343
Despite this finding, the House of Commons approved the
remedial order without debate on June 27, 2012, by a vote of
290-to-197.344 Following this approval, the remedial order went
to the House of Lords, where they debated for approximately
one hour. 345 During that hour, most of the debate again centered
around whether the Government’s response was sufficient in
protecting the public.346 Baroness Smith of Basildon noted that
in passing such legislation, “[t]here are three things to look at––
the costs, the benefit, and the risk.” 347 She focused on these
aspects in her critique of the Government’s response but did not
debate whether the Court was correct and whether the
Government should respond.348
Importantly, she did not
expressly suggest an alternative but merely stated that she “would
like the Government to go away and think about the
alternatives.” 349
One exception was Baroness Hamwee of
Richmond Upon Thames, who stated that it seemed to be a basic
right that an offender gets a hearing and mentioned her concern
with how long it has taken to pass a remedial order.350 She also
announced her disagreement with the JCHR, particularly that
she was “uneasy” about offenders having to wait fifteen years for
a review and that such a “serious matter” should go to a higher
court than a magistrate’s court. 351 Baron Lester of Herne Hill
responded on behalf of the JCHR, defending the process and
explaining that the JCHR “influenced the [G]overnment in
reshaping the order” and that the process demonstrates the
343
J. COMM. HUM. RTS, FIRST REPORT OF SESSION 2012–13: DRAFT SEXUAL
OFFENCES ACT 2003 (REMEDIAL) ORDER 2012: SECOND REPORT 3–4 (2012) (UK).
344 5547 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2012) col. 379 (UK).
345 738 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (2012) cols. 885–86 (UK).
346
347
348
349

See id.
Id. col. 880 (statement of B. Smith of Basildon).
Id. (statement of B. Smith of Basildon).
Id. col. 881 (statement of B. Smith of Basildon).

350
738 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (2012) cols. 883–84 (UK) (statement of B.
Hamwee of Richmond Upon Thames).
351 Id. col. 884 (statement of B. Hamwee of Richmond Upon Thames).
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success of the Human Rights Act in creating beneficial
“parliamentary procedure.” 352
Despite this, Lord Lester
acknowledged that the Government’s proposal was “widely
read.” 353 He then proposed to end the debate because the
Government and the JCHR “dealt with [the issue]
satisfactorily.” 354 The remedial order was then agreed to and
became effective on July 5, 2012.
3. Transgender Discrimination and Terrorist
Detention
Despite the importance of these two case studies from the
U.K., it is important to situate them within the broader U.K.
history of declarations of incompatibility. From the enactment of
the UK HRA to July 2017, twenty-five DOIs have become final. 355
Of these twenty-five DOIs, sixteen have been remedied by
legislation (either before or after the final judgment), and three
have been remedied by a remedial order. 356 The remaining six
were still under consideration by the Government as of July
2017. 357 Importantly, the Government has never stated that it
disagrees with the court’s decision and did not remedy the
incompatibility.358 In addition, the level of debate in these two
case studies appears to be the exception rather than the rule.
For example, Sathanapally found that between the enactment of
the UK HRA and 2010, “parliamentary debates in both Houses
demonstrate very little discussion of DOIs, and, in most cases,
little deliberation on reply legislation.” 359 Sathanapally does,
however, provide two examples of instances where there was
legislative debate.

352 738 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (2012) cols. 885–86 (UK) (statement of B. Lester
of Herne Hill).
353 Id. col. 886.
354

Id.

MINISTRY OF J., RESPONDING TO HUM. RTS JUDGMENTS: REPORT TO THE JCHR
ON THE GOV’T’S RESPONSE TO HUM. RTS JUDGMENTS, 2017, Cm. 9535, at 32 (UK).
355
356
357
358

Id.
Id.
See id.

359 SATHANAPALLY, supra note 5, at 138–39 (finding an especially pronounced
dearth of legislative debate in the early years of the UK HRA between 2000 and
2004).
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First, in Bellinger, a case involving discrimination against a
transgender individual, Sathanapally finds there was a “careful
and deliberate process of legislation” and the “legislative debates
. . . evidence an independent political deliberation on the
protection of rights.” 360 This case, however, is not a compelling
example of weak-form judicial review sparking legislative
engagement because it was not necessarily prompted by a
decision from a U.K. court. Instead, the Government had
“announced its intention to legislate to recognize the rights of
transsexuals” before the U.K. court’s judgments, and the U.K.
Government had been warned by the ECHR, beginning
approximately ten years before the U.K.’s House of Lords Court’s
decision, that its policy on transgender individuals was
problematic. 361 As a result, the legislative deliberation regarding
transgender individuals does not appear to have been triggered
by weak-form judicial review and thus is not a great example in
support of the dialogic benefit of weak-form judicial review.
Second, Sathanapally discusses the case of Belmarsh
Prisoners and mentions that it had the “highest public profile” of
all DOIs issued between 2000 and 2010. 362 The DOI declared
that an executive order that allows for the detention of terrorist
suspects without trial was incompatible with the right to life and
liberty found in Article 5 of the ECHR. 363 Although there was a
rather substantive debate in Parliament regarding legislative
responses to the DOI, the case should be taken with a grain of
salt when considering legislative engagement in models of weakform judicial review. For one, the case was regarding the rights
of foreign terrorist suspects in the wake of 9/11, a particularly
provoking issue, and thus a clear outlier. Second, although the
legislative debate was substantive, it was also relatively
constrained. Notably, the “[G]overnment exercised its powers to
control the legislative process in the House of Commons” and
shepherded the complex legislation through Parliament in less

360
361
362
363

Lords.

SATHANAPALLY, supra note 5, at 166, 169.
SATHANAPALLY, supra note 5, at 166.
SATHANAPALLY, supra note 5, at 189.
A (and others) v. Sec’y St, Home Dep’t, [2004] UKHL 56, 49 House of
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than three weeks.364
V.

COMPARISONS: DIALOGUE OF THE DEAF

Before reaching the conclusions of the case studies, it is
important to again mention the shortcoming of the analysis of
legislative engagement. The comparison performed in this
article only analyzed one model of weak-form judicial review, the
U.K., and so to reach more fruitful conclusions, comparisons with
other models of weak-form judicial review must also be
performed. Also, as previously mentioned, any analysis of
legislative engagement and debate is necessarily limited due to
factors inherent in legislatures and political systems. Despite
this, there are several important lessons about the level of
legislative engagement in weak-form versus strong-form models
of judicial review to be gleaned from the various case studies.
First, it is important to note several similarities between the
legislative engagement in both models. Legislatures in both
models seem to show respect for the decision of the court, even if
there is disagreement. In all three of the countries analyzed,
legislators, when discussing their disagreement with their
respective Supreme Courts, would nonetheless mention how they
have a great deal of respect for the Court. Although this was less
apparent for incredibly controversial political issues such as
campaign finance in the U.S., there was nevertheless a baseline of
respect shown. Despite the constant struggle between the Court
and the legislature for supremacy, even in India, legislators
showed respect for the court,
Additionally, in both systems of strong- and weak-form
judicial review, the legislative debate seems to add to the
conversation by bringing up important political and moral
arguments that can inform judicial decisions. The response to
U.S. v. Stevens , for example, included congressional findings that
the production of animal crush videos is obscene and lacks value.
These congressional findings provided useful political and moral
arguments in the law. 365 In the U.K., the inclusion of political
and moral arguments in the debate about the shaping of law can
SATHANAPALLY, supra note 5, at 196.
See Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1579 (2010) (discussing the legislative history
and intent behind the legislation).
364
365
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be seen in the response to Thompson in the House of Lords,
where Baroness Smith of Basildon noted the explicit political
costs and risks associated with the remedial order. 366 One
interesting point, however, is that the legislative response
including moral and political arguments into the debate in the
wake of a court decision is not limited to systems of weak-form
review, but also seems to occur in strong-form systems such as the
U.S. Similarly, both systems of weak- and strong-form judicial
review seem to allow for the correction of legislative blind-spots.
In the U.S., for example, this is evident from Senator Sessions’
statement that the court’s decision in Citizens United showed
“how far some congressionally passed laws reach” and “that
sometimes these bills reach farther than [Congress] intended.” 367
Again, however, this appears to be a benefit of judicial review
regardless of whether it is strong- or weak-form.
More important to the conclusion of this article, however,
are the differences between legislative engagement in weak- and
strong-form models of judicial review. In models of weak-form
judicial review, as in the U.K., there is rarely any legislative
debate about the possible responses to a DOI. When there is
legislative debate, the quantity and quality of this engagement
seem to be rather limited. Although there have been instances of
legislative engagement, this seems to be the exception rather
than the rule. Indeed, even on highly controversial issues, the
legislative debate was constrained by the Government and the
legislative process. For example, in the debate over social
housing entitlement, the provision that remedied the
incompatibility was an amendment buried deep within a complex
bill. This method of remedying a DOI limits the ability of the
Parliament to substantively debate the issue because they do not
have time to discuss every aspect of a large bill. Similarly,
because the Government controls the legislative process, it can
shepherd bills through Parliament quickly, occasionally without
significant debate, as was the case with the legislative response to
Belmarsh Prisoners. In contrast, the debate in strong-form
models of judicial review might be more substantial, as
366

See 738 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (2012) cols. 880-81 (UK).

111 CONG. REC. S108-09 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 2010) (statement of Sen. Jeff
Sessions).
367
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demonstrated by the case studies of India and the U.S. Although
the legislative process seems to nevertheless constrain the debate
in models of strong-form judicial review, it might be less
constrained than in models of weak-form judicial review.
In the case studies presented here, even when the legislature
in systems of weak-form judicial review does debate the issue,
there was little to no reference or mention of judicial reasoning.
In all examples of legislative engagement in the U.K., the
legislators merely seem to be complaining that the court is
wrong, but they do not provide reasoning as to why. For
example, in the legislative engagement after Thompson,
legislators simply mentioned that the court put the interests of
sex offenders over the safety of the public. While the legislators
are entitled to that opinion, it does not engage the judicial
decision in a way that can promote a meaningful dialogue. In
the models of strong-form judicial review analyzed here, the
picture is somewhat better. Although most legislators were
merely venting and simply mentioned their disagreement with
the courts, there were some notable exceptions. For example, in
the wake of Citizens United, several legislators discussed
constitutional reasoning by discussing how the judicial opinion
stands in contrast to the intentions of the Founding Fathers. 368
Similarly, in India, the legislators discussed judicial reasoning in
their debate over the requirements of election disclosures. For
example, one legislator discussed how the court was wrong to
require financial disclosure before the election because this does
not promote anti-corruption, believing that corruption can only
occur while in office.369 Another legislator discussed, similar to
the invocation of the Founding Fathers in the Citizens United
debate, that the Indian Constituent Assembly had explicitly
rejected the idea of educational prerequisites to running for
office and that the judicial opinion flies in the face of this
historical fact. 370 This sort of engagement with judicial reasoning
368
See, e.g., 111 CONG. REC. S108-09 (daily ed. Jan. 21, 2010) (statement of
Sen. Jeff Sessions); 111 CONG. REC. S354–55 (daily ed. Jan. 29, 2010) (statement of
Sen. Sheldon Whitehouse).
369
Lok Sabha Debate, supra note 236, at 1 (statement of Mem. of Parl.
Somnath Chatterjee) (noting that disclosures should not be required before the
election because corruption only “comes after you are elected”).
370
Lok Sabha Debate, supra note 236, at 13 (statement of Mem. of Parl.
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done by the legislature is the sort of substantive analysis that the
legislature must do to generate meaningful dialogue between the
branches of government.
In the rare instances that judicial reasoning was invoked in
the legislative engagement in the U.K., it seemed to concern
whether the remedying legislation will comply with the court’s
decision and be upheld in subsequent judicial review. This is
evident from the JCHR’s reports on the legislative proposals by
the Government in the wake of Thompson. The JCHR reasoned
that because the Court focused on the need for an independent
tribunal, allowing the police to decide the issue without the
possibility of judicial review was likely to not fully remedy the
incompatibility. Much legislative engagement in the U.S. was
also about whether remedial legislation would hold up during
another round of judicial review. This is apparent from the
legislative engagement in the wake of U.S. v. Stevens when
legislators spent time at hearings trying to figure out how to
tailor their response to fit within the bounds of the court decision
and to close the “loopholes” that would render the legislation
overbroad. 371
Similarly, in the U.K., there is not a willingness on the part
of Parliament or the Government to blatantly disregard a DOI.
When prodded on the possibility that Parliament does not
necessarily need to remedy the incompatibility, Theresa May
simply remarked that the Government had exhausted its appeals
and that the responsive legislation is a tough measure that will
remedy the issue.372 Similarly, in the legislative response to the
DOI regarding social housing entitlement, even though it was
apparent that the Government did not agree with the decision, it
simply refused to act for multiple years before finally being
pressured into passing a remedy instead of remedying the
incompatibility. In contrast, despite the finality of judicial review
in both India and the U.S., there does appear to be more of a
Somnath Chatterjee).
371
See, e.g., United States v. Stevens: The Supreme Court’s Decisions

Invalidating the Crush Video Statute: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Crime,
Terrorism, and Homeland Sec. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong.
at 24–25 (2010) (statement of Rep. Louie Gohmert).
372
523 Parl Deb HC (6th ser.) (2011) col. 967 (UK) (statement of Sec’y of St.
for the Home Dept. Theresa May).
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willingness to challenge Court decisions. For example, after
Citizens United, there have been several proposed constitutional
amendments that would explicitly reverse the Court’s decision. 373
In addition, legislators in the U.S. seem to implicitly
acknowledge that they can participate in the constitutional
debate with means other than a constitutional amendment. For
example, in the wake of Citizens United, legislators attempted to
pass multiple pieces of legislation that would have implemented
the restrictions in place before Citizens United, despite the
Court’s decision.374 In India, the legislation that was passed,
despite eventually being partially overturned by the court in a
subsequent round of judicial review, explicitly repealed the
court’s decision.375
Lastly, the legislative engagement in the U.K. seems to rely
almost entirely on the JCHR. For example, in the legislative
response to Thompson, it was quite apparent that the remedial
order had not been “widely read.” 376 Nevertheless, the order was
approved because the JCHR had gone through an iterative
process with the Government and had given the order its official
stamp of approval. Although it is useful to have legislative
engagement in a committee setting, it risks curtailing a broader
parliamentary debate. This is problematic because it prevents
the legislature from fully engaging on the merits of the judicial
decision and detracts from the democratic legitimacy argument
often advanced in support of weak-form judicial review.
Drew Desilver, Proposed Amendments to the U.S. Constitution Seldom Go
PEW
RESEARCH
CENTER,
(Apr.
12,
2018),
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2018/04/12/a-look-at-proposedconstitutional-amendments-and-how-seldom-they-go-anywhere/; see also Andrew
Prokop, The Constitutional Amendment That Would Overturn Citizens United,
Explained, VOX (Sept. 11, 2014), https://www.vox.com/2014/9/11/6131163/citizensunited-constitutional-amendment-explained.
374 See e.g., Citizens United v. F.E.C., 130 S. Ct. 876, 895–96 (2010).
375
Representation of the People (Third) Amendment Act, 2002, Section 33B,
No. 4 Acts of Parliament, 2002 (India) (repealed in part by People’s Union for Civil
Liberties v. Union of India (2003) 2 S.C.R. 529). Section 33B explicitly stated
“Notwithstanding anything contained in any judgment, decree or order of any
court or any direction, order or any other instruction issued by the Election
Commission, no candidate shall be liable to disclose or furnish any such
information, in respect of his election which is not required to be disclosed or
furnished under this Act or the rules made thereunder.” Id.
376 See 738 Parl Deb HL (5th ser.) (2012) cols. 885–86 (UK).
373

Anywhere,
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CONCLUSION

In sum, the case studies presented here challenge our
assumptions about the benefits of weak-form judicial review
because they demonstrate that legislative engagement in models
of weak-form judicial review might be lacking. In the U.K.,
although there is occasionally parliamentary debate and the
JCHR does an excellent job in assessing remedial legislation in
the wake of DOIs, the parliamentary debate is limited in quality
and quantity. Instead of being willing to blatantly challenge
judicial decisions, the debate within the legislature focuses mainly
on how to comply with the judicial decision. Where there is
disagreement, it is not publicly voiced. Instead, the Parliament
will try to subvert the decision by delaying its response to the
decision or by implementing an order that, although it claims
remedies the incompatibility, does not, in fact, do so. In
contrast, the legislative engagement in models of strong-form
judicial review might be somewhat more substantial with
legislators occasionally using judicial reasoning to assess judicial
decisions and willing to expressly challenge the validity of court
decisions. This demonstrates that it is possible to have a
constitutional dialogue even in models of strong-form judicial
review. Further research into the normative reasons for this
difference is warranted. For this article’s purposes, however, it is
sufficient to note that in analyzing whether there is a meaningful
dialogue between the court and the legislature, one must not
simply look at how often courts strike down legislation or how
often legislatures override court decisions; instead, the analysis
must also include whether each party is performing its own
independent institutional duties of constitutional interpretation
during their part of the dialogue.

